

MEMOIRES DE
LA SOCIÉTÉ ROYALE
DU CANADA

SECTION II

Littérature, histoire, archéologie, sociologie, économie politique,
et sujets connexes, en français

TROISIÈME SÉRIE—TOME LII—SECTION I

SÉANCE DE JUIN 1958




TRANSACTIONS OF
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
Volume LII of the Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada (1958) consists of the Proceedings and the papers of Sections II, III, IV, and V *only*.

Section I has decided not to publish any papers in the 1958 Transactions.

Veillez noter que le Tome LII des Mémoires et comptes rendus de la Société royale du Canada (1958) comprend les Procès-verbaux et les Mémoires des Sections II, III, IV, et V *seulement*.


La Section I a décidé de ne pas publier de communications dans le volume de 1958.

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1



PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The Revival of Conservatism in North America

FRANK H. UNDERHILL, F.R.S.C.

THESE are the reflections of an elderly displaced person out of the nineteenth century, a homeless liberal.

A few years ago, in 1952, I read a little book by a young American historian, Stuart Hughes, on Spengler and his philosophy of history.¹ Mr. Hughes told how in Munich in 1911 the idea for his *magnum opus* suddenly came to Spengler as he brooded on the Moroccan crisis of that year—a crisis that almost precipitated World War I—and how, a little later, his title, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, dawned on him when he saw in a bookstore a volume on the fall (*Untergang*) of the Ancient World. Mr. Hughes then proceeded to analyse the intellectual atmosphere of that year 1911. He picked out four men, contemporaries of Spengler, who were to be seminal thinkers for the next generation: Freud in Vienna, Pareto in Lausanne, Bergson and Sorel in Paris. By 1911, said Mr. Hughes, these four men had reached and published their final conclusions. And he pointed out how such thinkers “with their scepticism about the power of reason to control man’s actions and their doubts of his capacity for moral and political progress, lived in a world far removed from the optimism and self-confidence of the popular writers, the men of affairs, and the leaders of parliamentary majorities” of 1911.

Well, those opening pages of Mr. Hughes’ book on Spengler rang a bell in my mind. For 1911 was the year in which I graduated from the University of Toronto, an honour graduate in Classics and in English and History, in my own estimation at that time a very sophisticated young intellectual. And yet of the four men picked out by Mr. Hughes—who was himself not born till 1916—as the intellectual fathers of the coming twentieth century, I had at that time, to the best of my recollection, heard only of one. How unfitted I must have been to deal with the world of which I was in 1911, becoming a citizen! And, alas, how unsuccessful I have been ever since in catching up with the twentieth century!

All this doesn’t matter much as yet in a country like Canada, where we have not experienced the revolutionary upheavals, the unendurable agonies, the intellectual and spiritual disintegration through which our contemporaries in Europe and Asia have been going. There has been no breakdown in our inheritance from the past. We still accept, on the whole, the values of our fathers. We have not been driven to become tortured existentialists.

¹H. Stuart Hughes, *Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate* (New York, 1952).

In particular, our political experience—the field to which I have devoted most of my studies—is still pretty much confined within the nineteenth-century categories of “liberal” and “conservative.” This is largely true, also, of our American neighbours, though their history has shown a much greater experience of tragedy than is within our Canadian capacity. Both of us still proceed on the North American assumption either that God is too good to damn us or that we are too good for God to damn, that is, in the optimistic attitude towards man’s ability to solve his problems which tends to produce liberal historians and social scientists even more than liberal politicians.

In this paper I shall be dealing mostly with North American liberalism and conservatism. The revival of conservatism is, of course, a part of that general reaction against the confident liberal and democratic beliefs, the optimistic faith in intellectual and moral progress, which the nineteenth century inherited from the eighteenth-century Enlightenment—the reaction to which Mr. Hughes was referring when he picked out Freud, Pareto, Bergson, and Sorel as the intellectual fathers of our age. Conservatism in North America, as well as in Europe, is, in its essence, a reaction against the Enlightenment. But this reaction, as far as North America is concerned, is still primarily to be observed amongst our intellectuals. The breezes that blow first across university campuses have not yet penetrated into the smoke-filled rooms where political party policy is made or into the polling booths where the voters express their conscious or their subconscious desires. And even our intellectuals are, for the most part, only *reporting* what their European contemporaries have experienced.

So I shall be dealing with the conservatism and liberalism that still dominate politics in the English-speaking world. Being an historian and not a sociologist, I shall not waste time trying to define my terms. The historian is acutely aware that it is impossible at any given period of history to give a coherent, logical, internally consistent account of what conservatives are trying to conserve—or, for that matter, of what liberals are trying to liberate or socialists to socialize.² This intellectual confusion, in fact, is what fascinates him in his study of human society.

Professor Clinton Rossiter, in his book, *Conservatism in America*,³ which is by far the best book on conservatism that has been published in our day, though one seldom sees it referred to by Canadian conservatives, spends his first sixty pages in analysing what makes up the conservative spirit and

²On the sporting page of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 23, 1958, there is an interview with a minor league professional coach who complains that the major leagues are no longer concerned about the fate of the minors because they can now recruit their players from the colleges, from the youths who are at college on athletic scholarships or subsidies. He laments this crushing out of the minor leagues by the financially better endowed institutions of higher learning. “To me it’s a very bad thing,” he says. “As I see it, it’s a direct step to socialism. Privately operated sports arenas and teams haven’t got a chance when faced with such competition.” Thus does the meaning of socialism, in our modern mass culture, expand and ramify.

³New York, 1955.

temper; and then he sums up this introduction by giving a list of what he calls "the twenty-one points of the conservative tradition." I commend this list to every one of the 3,900,000 Canadians who voted the Progressive Conservative government into power last March 31. It would be enlightening for them to test themselves by the Rossiter twenty-one points, which I think would be accepted by most political philosophers. How, for example, would they react to these points?:

4. The inevitability and necessity of social classes.
5. The need for a ruling and serving aristocracy.
6. The fallibility and potential tyranny of majority rule.

Professor Rossiter advances one particular argument that is worth the attention of Canadians. He agrees with most American thinkers who have been writing on this topic of late that the American tradition is essentially a liberal one,⁴ and that it is impossible for an American conservatism, which is conservative in the Burkean sense, to take root. The reason is that America has not known for generations a feudal system headed by a monarchy, a landed aristocracy, a peasantry, an established church, an exclusive educational system for the *élite* culminating in an Oxford or a Cambridge; nor has America produced the revolutionary mob or the totalitarian Jacobin democratic philosophy in opposition to which European conservatism came into being in the days of Burke.⁵ Whatever our nostalgic, ultra-monarchical, conservative sentimentalists in Canada may say, these remarks are largely true about Canada also. Ours is not the social structure out of which the English or European type of conservatism could be built.

* * *

Let me turn now to some of the conservative breezes that have been blowing recently across American university campuses. Everyone remarks nowadays on the different intellectual climate of the 1950's as compared with the 1930's. After World War I the *avant-garde* was left-wing and agnostic; now it is right-wing and religious. "Dostoevsky now carries more weight with undergraduates than Karl Marx."⁶ This change of climate began in literary circles long before economic and political developments had done much to affect the thinking of historians and social scientists. In these latter circles

⁴The classical contemporary statement of this thesis is that of Professor Lewis Hartz in his book *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, 1955).

⁵Professor Rossiter himself, though he has done so much sympathetic writing on American conservatism and conservatives, has denied that he is himself a conservative. In a letter to the *Reporter* (Aug. 11, 1955) in reply to criticism by Prof. A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., he wrote: "In the meantime put me down as a mixture of Case Republican, Lausche Democrat, Corwin constitutionalist, Lippmann moralist and Niebuhr realist. . . . My love for Jefferson is strong and understanding; my aim, quite unlike that of the Burkean conservatives, is to sober and strengthen the American liberal tradition, not to destroy it."

⁶Daniel Aaron, "Conservatism Old and New" (*American Quarterly*, Summer, 1954).

the intellectual bankruptcy of the liberal cause has been caused largely by the success of the liberal New Deal programme and its acceptance by the moderate conservatives among the Republicans. Liberals are at a loss because they cannot win the victories of the 1930's over again, and prosperity has disintegrated the coalition of grievance groups—labour, farmers, ethnic minorities, intellectuals—which carried through the New Deal programme. They have neither a programme nor a party. American capitalism has recovered from its sickness of the 1930's and is now producing both goods and freedom to nearly everybody's satisfaction, including that of the intellectuals.

The result is a general acceptance of society by high-brows, middle-brows, and low-brows, to a degree which can hardly be matched in any previous period of American history and is not paralleled in other parts of the world. American intellectuals, who once proclaimed aloud their alienation from their society, are now, as the well-known saying has it, conducting a love affair with the United States. They are going back with loving tenderness to the American past again, and writing books on the American Heritage. Universities establish institutes or set up interdisciplinary committees to study American Civilization. Articles appear in learned journals celebrating the uniqueness of this civilization—not articles of the old spread-eagle fourth-of-July bombastic type written for mass consumption but articles written to be read by the educated minority. And, as a part of all this process, a new generation of avowed conservatives is blossoming forth on all the American campuses.

Back in 1952, in the autumn number of the *American Scholar*, a conservatively minded political scientist, Professor Raymond English of Kenyon College, published an article which he entitled "Conservatism: The Forbidden Faith." He began with these three sentences: "It is interesting to reflect that if Congress were to pass a statute outlawing Conservatives in the United States, there would be scarcely a ripple on the surface of American life. The status quo would be unaltered, for no American admits that he is, still less claims to be, a Conservative. Americans would simply remain as they were: they would all without exception be Liberals." He went on to argue that in actual fact America was a nation of Conservative fellow-travellers and that its eighteenth-century liberal formulas had become mainly just ritualistic incantations; and then he proceeded to demonstrate how much philosophic conservative writing there was among American intellectuals appealing to an educated audience. At the very moment when his article appeared, in the autumn of 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower was about to be elected president of the United States. Since then there has been no lack of professed conservatives in American public affairs or in American universities.

In fact one of the most notable features of the last half-dozen years or so has been the outburst of first-class conservative writing in the quality periodicals and in books. The two men who appear to have sparked this conservative renaissance are Russell Kirk, whose first book, *The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana* appeared in 1953; and Peter Viereck

whose *Conservatism Revisited* appeared in 1950. Viereck is a poet and a high-spirited individualist who goes his own way, and his later writings have been more and more critical of actual conservatives and actual conservatism in America. Kirk's conservatism, when pruned of his expressions of extreme contempt for most of his academic contemporaries, seems to be not much more than a nostalgic sentimental attempt to recall the good old days of English (and Scottish) upper-class society before the serpent of industrialism and democracy had corrupted the Garden of Eden. (Kirk did his graduate work at St. Andrews.) As Clinton Rossiter remarked of him, "he has begun to sound like a man born one hundred and fifty years too late and in the wrong country."⁷ He hates the industrialization of his native state, Michigan, with a passionate hatred. But how can an American conservative be anything but irrelevant if he doesn't admire those two great Michigan bulwarks of practical American conservatism, General Motors and Ford?

Still, Kirk is now the editor of a high-brow conservative quarterly, *Modern Age*, published in Chicago. He helped also to start a conservative weekly in New York, the *National Review*. Incidentally, an advertisement of the *National Review* in a recent number of *Modern Age* boasts of "interesting timely articles every week by America's leading conservative writers—men like Whittaker Chambers, Russell Kirk, James Burnham, John Chamberlain, Max Eastman and John Dos Passos." With the exception of Kirk himself everyone of these "leading conservative writers" was in the 1920's or 1930's a Marxian of some shade of red—a fact which illustrates where some of the current conservative revival comes from in the United States. One of the weaknesses of conservatism in Canada as an intellectual influence would seem to be that not enough of our intellectuals went Marxian in the 1930's, and so they aren't around now to repent in the 1950's.

The two conservative books which seem to me to stand out for their incisive, realistic, and illuminating discussion of conservatism in America are Clinton Rossiter's volume to which I have already referred and Gordon Harrison's *Road to the Right*.⁸ Rossiter is a professor of political science at Cornell, and Harrison an editorial writer on the *Detroit News*. We have no real parallel to either of these two men in Canada as yet. The recent history of the Canadian Conservative party has been written for us by an American student: John R. Williams—*The Conservative Party of Canada: 1920–1949*—a rather unsympathetic study.⁹ Our Canadian journalists do not write books as a rule, and our university political scientists do not admit, as a rule, to conservative sympathies; they are still detached objective "scientists."¹⁰

⁷*Conservatism in America*, p. 211.

⁸New York, 1954.

⁹Durham, N. C., 1956.

¹⁰Professor David McCord Wright of McGill is a conspicuous and welcome exception. He has been a contributor to *Modern Age* and to *Fortune*, though one of his earlier articles in *Fortune* (May, 1951) was entitled "When You Call Me Conservative, Smile."

Of course, long before this recent outburst of conservative writing, there was one writer, read by university people across America, who was steadily producing brilliant and thoughtful books which were expositions of conservative ideas—Walter Lippmann. From the early 1920's, when he first began to express doubts about government based on "public opinion," to his latest volume on *The Public Philosophy*¹¹ Mr. Lippmann has been giving expression to conservative criticism of modern democracy. Perhaps it is significant that twenty or thirty years ago, when he used to refer to himself as a liberal, he was greeted with sneers from the academic left. Now that everyone recognizes him as a conservative, he has become as solid an American institution as Robert Frost.

Like Robert Frost, I was not radical enough in my youth to go conservative in my old age. Consequently I find most of this current conservative writing by American intellectuals interesting and stimulating, but not deeply moving. What seems to me, with my ingrained prejudices, more significant as to the trend of American political thought is the revisionary tendency which one can discern everywhere in the writings of American liberals. I propose to cite some examples of this liberal revisionism.

I do not need to dwell here at any length on the tremendous influence of Reinhold Niebuhr. When I first made his acquaintance in the early 1930's he was the leading spirit in a society of Socialist Christians. During the 1940's he and his fellow members became steadily less sure about their socialism and more sure that the Christian insight into the evil potentialities of human nature was needed to check the optimist and utopian illusions of people on the left about what can be accomplished by politics. Niebuhr's preaching over the past twenty-five years has profoundly affected the attitude of all American university liberals. The pessimistic liberalism of the book *The Vital Center* by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,¹² is a good example of this Niebuhr influence. Niebuhr's own recent book, *The Irony of American History*,¹³ is one long sermon on the moral ambiguities in which idealist American reformers and rationalist intellectuals have become involved because of their superficial understanding of human nature and society.

Personally I find Reinhold Niebuhr the most penetrating and illuminating writer on politics whom I read. All the same, his influence has not been altogether to the good. A healthy society needs a certain proportion of idealist utopians among its members to balance those who are natural sceptics and pessimists. If you read Niebuhr you cannot remain a utopian of the left. But a society whose utopians are all on the right is likely to head in the direction of Gaullist France.

I have mentioned already the tendency in recent American historical and political writing towards a renewed cherishing of the American tradition as such. The fashion of debunking which was popular when I was young in

¹¹Boston, 1955.

¹²New York, 1949.

¹³New York, 1952.

the 1920's has now passed away. Bright young Ph.D.'s now write theses refuting Charles A. Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, which burst on my mind like a flash of lightning when I first read it just after World War I. What marks our present decade is this new intense sense of belonging, of "togetherness."

The evolution of Max Lerner supplies a good example. Back in the 1930's and 1940's there was a Marxian strain in his thought, always moving as he did towards the conclusion that Western capitalist society was doomed. He was telling us in one book that *It's Later than You Think*,¹⁴ and in another was collecting *Ideas For the Ice Age*.¹⁵ His friend, Harold Laski, produced his *magnum opus* a few years later—*The American Democracy*¹⁶—as a complete, systematic Marxian interpretation of American civilization. But today Max Lerner, now a Professor of American Civilization in Brandeis University, produces his own *magnum opus*, a fat volume of 1,000 pages, on *America as a Civilization*,¹⁷ on which he has been working for more than ten years; and it is one long answer to the Laski thesis. Lerner has arrived at a genial, urbane, fascinated appreciation of his American society. He sees it as essentially pluralist, and he enjoys all aspects of it. He doesn't agree with Professor C. Wright Mills, one of the younger academic radicals who carries on in the tradition of the 1930's, that the country is passing under the rule of a "power élite."¹⁸ He is a liberal now rather than a radical, but a liberal who is remarkably complacent and who feels no pressing urge to get excited about any social phenomenon. America has been saved by its pluralism; the Ice Age is not descending upon us. Professor C. Wright Mills seems to be a lonely radical voice crying in a conservatively liberal wilderness.

American history-writing has been going through this same change of tone and emphasis. A significant illustration may be taken from Professor Allan Nevins of Columbia. In the *Saturday Review* of February 6, 1954, he engaged in a controversy with Matthew Josephson, the author of the very hostile study of American post-Civil-War business entitled *The Robber Barons*.¹⁹ Professor Nevins called for a reinterpretation of the great economic revolution of the last century in America:

Now we have historians who view our whole national life as an unconscious preparation for the time when we should become Protector of the Faith for all democratic peoples. These writers regard American history not in terms of the Western continent but in terms of an Atlantic community. . . . My own guess is that this great development by which America has been projected into world leadership . . . may in some fashion be connected by future interpreters with the advent of an age of mass action, mass production and mass psychology in

¹⁴New York, 1938.

¹⁵New York, 1941.

¹⁶New York, 1948.

¹⁷New York, 1957.

¹⁸C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York, 1951; republished in a paper-back, 1956). C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956).

¹⁹New York, 1934.

American life. . . . It was our mass production that won the last two wars; it was our genius for making big organization work which has built the means for saving Western democracy since the last world war. . . . We may look forward to a more appreciative attitude toward our material strength, and to a more scientific treatment of the factors which have created this material power. . . . In the past our historians were apologetic about this . . . they intimated that America had grown too fast, too coarsely, too muscularly; they exalted the rural virtues as against industrial might. . . . We can now assert that this historical attitude was in part erroneous. The nation grew none too fast. We can see today that all its wealth, all its strength were needed to meet a succession of world crises. . . . Had the United States not possessed the mightiest oil industry, the greatest steel industry, the largest automobile factories, the most efficient machine-tool industry, the best technological schools, and the most ingenious working force in the world, we would indubitably have lost World War II. . . . The architects of our material growth—the men like Whitney, McCormick, Westinghouse, Carnegie, Hill and Ford—will yet stand forth in their true stature as builders, for all their faults, of a strength which civilization found indispensable. . . . We shall also come to realize that the turmoil and human suffering which inescapably accompanied the industrial revolution and the mass-production revolution were not, after all, a tremendous price to pay for their benefits.²⁰

Note Professor Nevins' insistence here on the unity of the United States with Western Europe. This is a popular theme in American universities nowadays. In 1946, Professor Carleton Hayes, President of the American Historical Association, devoted his presidential address to an attack on the Turner frontier theory with its emphasis on American democratic uniqueness and American separation from Europe.²¹ He entitled his address "The American Frontier: Frontier of What?" and went on to argue that America through its history had been a frontier of Western Europe and that what it had inherited from Britain and Europe was just as important to an understanding of its history as what it had developed on its own frontier. This theme of the indissoluble Atlantic community has, of course, been taken up by Canadian conservative historians who do not like our Canadian nationalism with its somewhat cool, detached attitude towards Britain. But what will happen to this consolation derived by Canadian conservatives from our special, unique ties across the Atlantic, if the United States also becomes more and more deeply tied into the Atlantic community?

The other main point of Professor Nevins' thesis is his emphasis on the creative character of American business and large-scale industry, and the central place which it holds in modern American history.²² This note in

²⁰*Saturday Review*, Feb. 6, 1954, pp. 7-49.

²¹See *American Historical Review*, vol. LI, no. 2 (January, 1946).

²²Professor Louis M. Hacker of Columbia has expressed similar opinions to those of Professor Nevins on the interpretation of American history. See his review of the book by Professor H. Hale Bellot of the University of London on *American History and American Historians* (*Political Studies*, vol. I, no. 2, June, 1953).

He criticizes Bellot for accepting the views of "the Middle Western School," that is, "the assumption of Turner and his disciples that the central theme of American history is the conquest of a continental wilderness . . . through the creation of a set of moving

conservative historiography has not appeared so clearly in our Canadian guild of historians as in the United States. But Professor J. M. S. Careless in his most interesting article in the *Canadian Historical Review* has suggested that he can discern a change of emphasis here also from an older generation of "environmentalist" historians to a newer school who are taking up the development of metropolitan business as the central theme in the making of Canada.²³ No doubt we are about to hear from Canadian academic circles more and more about the creative virtues of St. James Street and Bay Street.

As for Professor Nevins in the United States, he has been practising what he preaches, though I understand that he voted and worked for Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson. After producing two great works on John D. Rockefeller, he is now writing the history of Henry Ford.

Another writer, one of the younger historians at Columbia, Richard Hofstadter, may be taken to illustrate still another aspect of this shift from the old liberal-progressive point of view. How many volumes have been written on the agrarian protest movements in American politics from the days of Jefferson to those of the two Roosevelts! Most of these volumes presented the farmer as struggling nobly against the bonds which were being riveted round him by Wall Street financiers, railway tycoons, packing-house operators, farm-machinery manufacturers, and so on. And on this theme most Canadian historians, like most American historians, have sympathized with the protest movements. But some of the American ones have been taking a fresh look at their Populist and Progressive eras. Hofstadter's recent book, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.*,²⁴ is almost completely revisionist. He stresses the seamy side of the whole Populist movement. He points out the wide gap between what he calls the Agrarian Myth—the

frontiers, and that this was largely done by pioneers who . . . became farmers engaged in extensive agriculture." This assumption, says Hacker, "takes as given the non-capitalist and anti-capitalist character of much of American attitudes, institutions and thought . . . that America was built up by hard physical work alone (a crude labor theory of value), that mercantile preoccupations were parasitic, and that banking and credit and, indeed, too, manufacturing were exploitative."

Professor Hacker goes on to express the view that another school is bound to emerge as the interest in American economic history in the universities grows. "Such a school will start out with another set of assumptions, as follows: Here is a new and poor country grappling with the problems of capital creation and credit-worthiness; it is from the beginning closely linked with the outside world through trade and the movement of short-term capital (to finance the trade) and long-term investments. . . . Government policy, sometimes clearly, sometimes unconsciously responds to such needs. . . . We shall have a new American history which will be closer to the realities than the one currently dominating the American universities; for the products of the Middle Western School, essentially romantic, strongly underscoring the individual's struggle against nature and corporate power, are blind or hostile to the processes by which a poverty-stricken and defenceless nation became rich and powerful."

²³J. M. S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism and Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Review*, vol. XXXV, no. 1 (March, 1954).

²⁴New York, 1955.

picture of the farmer as a purer type of democrat than the slick city dweller, and as the typical ideal American—and the actualities of present-day American agriculture, where the efficient large-scale farmer has become a successful business man and the inefficient small-scale operator should really be eliminated as uneconomic. He asserts that urban America now keeps agricultural America going by continuous subsidies, and that the farm bloc has become a pressure group as selfish as those of urban industries. And he draws attention to the tendency of western agrarianism to go sour with the passage of time. The areas where Populism was once strongest are now the areas which spawn McCarthyism and are most apt to develop unhealthy manifestations of anti-intellectualism, nativism, anti-semitism.

To a Canadian reader the most significant thing about Hofstadter's book is that almost every page suggests disillusioning parallels with agrarian movements in Canada—especially now that our insurgent farm movements of the 1920's and 1930's, which set out to make a new world for the prairie wheat farmer, have slowly transformed themselves into what to an eastern Canadian is apt to look suspiciously like a pressure-group to compel eastern taxpayers to keep the prairie farmer in the style to which he would like to become accustomed. I sometimes wonder whether the Hofstadter volume is available in the libraries of the universities of Alberta and Saskatchewan.

Still another American volume, by a man whom I should consider a liberal rather than a conservative, is worth picking out to illustrate something else that has been going on in American historical and sociological studies. This is Professor Frank Tannenbaum's book, *A Philosophy of Labor*.²⁵ Most historians on this continent have tended to sympathize with the attempts of the industrial workers to organize themselves, and to regard them, because of their underprivileged position, as a useful radical force in politics. Professor Tannenbaum points out that organized labour, having achieved a recognized status in the American economy, is on the way to becoming a conservative force in society. What it really wanted all along was not to create a completely new world, in spite of its Messianic professions, but to achieve a share of power in the existing capitalist world.²⁶ "The quarrel between the labor union and management has always been a family quarrel." Professor Tannenbaum overworks his thesis. But it is significant that labour leaders like Walter Reuther, who were once Socialists, now vote Democrat, and that the Socialist party in the United States has gone to pieces because it could not win, as similar parties did in Europe, the support of the organized industrial workers. "Trade unionism needs capitalism like a fish needs water" said David Dubinski, also once a Socialist. "On the shoals of beefsteak and apple-pie, all socialist ships founder," said a

²⁵New York, 1952.

²⁶Mr. Attlee, the British Labour Prime Minister, said something the same about American trade unions, though in a less sympathetic tone of voice: "American trade unionism seemed to me to suffer from a lack of the idealist spirit that adherence to the Socialist creed brings with it. The general outlook appeared to me to be materialist, differing little from that of other acquisitive groups." C. R. Attlee, *As It Happened* (London, 1954).

sociologist observing the American labour scene. Is Canadian labour likely to break away from these American precedents?

The point here is that those two great supports of American radical thinking, agrarianism and labourism, can no longer be counted on as of yore. They have become just two more big pressure-groups within a society which all groups accept. And thinkers on the left who used to get inspiration from studying them are adjusting themselves accordingly.

Let me refer finally to two books by economists: one by Adolf A. Berle, the other by Kenneth Galbraith. Berle was one of Franklin D. Roosevelt's brain trust. Before that, he had been co-author with Gardiner Means of a book on the American business corporation which was taken by most liberals to be a warning against the irresponsible power achieved by the managers of big corporations now that the control of the shareholders had become a merely legal formality.²⁷ But in 1954 he published *The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution*²⁸ in which he argued that the big business corporation has become the significant form of capitalist enterprise, that in most industrial fields there is a concentration in which two or three corporations give the lead in making policy and setting prices, that these leaders are developing a conscience and a sense of social responsibility, that they seem able to conduct international relations and make international agreements more successfully than can political governments—and that all this is *good*, that the corporation developing in these unexpected directions represents the chief hope that our society may remain progressive and liberal. Berle's book would seem to be the most challenging of all the revisions of liberal thinking that have been taking place of late years.²⁹

Another revision in the same direction is Professor Kenneth Galbraith's now familiar argument that modern capitalistic enterprise tends to develop within itself correctives to its tendencies towards monopoly, by the throwing up of centres of "countervailing power" which arise in unexpected places and are more effective than political restrictions imposed by government.³⁰

Well, I have been making a selection of liberal thinkers in the American academic world who have been moving in a conservative direction. This movement, and the emergence of professedly conservative thinkers, cannot have been altogether unconnected with the return of a conservative government to office in Washington after an exile of twenty years. But let us not

²⁷Adolf A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932).

²⁸New York, 1954.

²⁹In the last chapter, entitled "Corporate Capitalism and 'The City of God,'" Berle sketches his own personal Utopia. He thinks that the corporation, as the "conscience-carrier of twentieth-century American society" will be influenced by "certain great philosophical premises" derived from outside the business organization, and he concludes that "there is solid ground for the expectation that twenty years from now the men of greatest renown in the United States will be the spiritual, philosophical and intellectual leaders, for the sufficient reason that they will be needed more than any other type of men." This is the typical Utopia of the university professor.

³⁰J. K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power* (Boston, 1952).

over-estimate what has happened. Conservative academic egg-heads have not been welcomed to Washington by the Eisenhower administration as their liberal fellows were welcomed in New Deal days. The revival of American conservatism means in practice the acceptance once more by the American voter of business leadership in politics, not of leadership by conservative intellectuals. While Russell Kirk & Co. talk about the need for aristocratic leadership if a society is to be healthy, and the need for a religious basis to politics *à la* Burke, all that has happened is that a plutocracy is now guiding national policy and that President Eisenhower discovered, on being elected, that he was a Presbyterian and now opens cabinet meetings with prayer.

The question still remains whether a plutocracy is capable of becoming an aristocracy, that is, of adopting views on national policy which are based on wider conceptions of the national good than a selfish understanding of its own economic interest.³¹ It is their clarity and hard-headedness in pointing out that in practice the leadership of an American conservatism must come from business, and that the quality of American conservatism depends therefore on the quality of the ideas of business men, which make the two books by Messrs. Rossiter and Harrison so valuable.

I remember, back in 1929, when Walter Lippmann announced in his *Preface to Morals* that American business leadership had at last reached this aristocratic stage of maturity. According to him it had proved itself capable (under Coolidge and Hoover!) of working for the general good of the community as well as for its own power and profit. And then in the fall of 1929, on the very heels of the Lippmann book, came the Wall Street crash and the start of the long deep depression. We were treated to a vivid revelation of how much *noblesse oblige* there really was in the intellectual and moral make-up of the American big business man. Today Adolf Berle is making somewhat the same claim for big business corporations as Lippmann made thirty years ago. Well, we shall see.

The most exalted claims for the right of capitalist enterprisers to leadership are, of course, those which appear in *Fortune*. In its issue of December, 1955, its publisher, Henry R. Luce, printed an article of his own which was simply flabbergasting in its Messianic exaltation.³² It was the last of a series in which a variety of writers had been giving their speculations about what America would be like twenty-five years on, in 1980.

Collaboration with God would almost perfectly define "the American religion"—the religion so easily condemned as over-optimistic, complacent and shallow. . . . Man in our time and especially in America has become cooperative man. . . . The organization of homo Americanus makes all previous types of organization, including the Roman Empire, seem simple and naive. The

³¹"What's good for General Motors is good for the United States."

³²In fairness to *Fortune*, which is, after all, the most intelligent and philosophical journalistic expositor of American conservatism, month in and month out, it should be remembered that it was a *Fortune* editor, William H. Whyte, who wrote *The Organization Man* (1956), the best protest on behalf of the individualistic liberal spirit of J. S. Mill that we have had in our day. Most of the Whyte book had already appeared as articles in *Fortune*.

American business corporation typifies, though it by no means exhausts, the American capacity for high organization. . . . Having organized production and distribution as the ninth wonder of the world, the modern corporation finds a new subject for its organization prowess. It is now organizing itself, quite self-consciously, as a responsible social unit. . . . Its newer critics now express the fear that it may have bitten off more social responsibility than it can chew. In any case we've got it—social consciousness organized on a scale never attempted before. *We have made a turn in the development of human nature.*³³

If I were theologically inclined, I should be tempted to say that there is something blasphemous in this right-wing utopian vision of the publisher of *Fortune*. But I shall confine myself to remarking that there is nothing aristocratic about it. For the aristocrat has a sense of limits. That is why aristocratic conservatism in a community like Britain has for so long been so successful. But Mr. Luce's vision is the vision of the driver of the Cadillac car, that car which so perfectly symbolizes American big business—powerful, heavy, pretentious, flamboyant, arrogant, vulgar; and which sets the tone for little business as well—since nearly all American cars now try to look like Cadillacs travelling incognito.

I should believe more readily in the aristocratic potentialities of big business leaders if I saw more Continentals on the road. In *Fortune*, at about the same time as Mr. Luce's article, the Continental was advertising itself in this way: "There are some things you *sense*. They never have to be spelled out. Not even in a car. Take the Continental Mark II for example. It is a *conservative*³⁴ car because of the deliberate simplicity of its styling. It is quietly dignified, yet in an excitingly dynamic way. From the start we have kept very much in our minds the kind of *man* in whom this kind of *car* would strike a responsive chord. Perhaps that is why the Continental so aptly expresses the art of being inconspicuously important." Alas, the Continental Mark II did not strike a responsive chord in enough business men, and it was withdrawn. There weren't enough of them, presumably, who wanted to practice the subtle aristocratic art of being inconspicuously important.

The Continental Mark III, to judge from its pictures, seems to be on the way to becoming a variation of the Lincoln. (Who was it who said that the Republican party is the party of Lincoln—and Cadillac?) If our North American economy should fail by 1980 to realize Mr. Luce's dream of full co-operation with God, and if it should get into serious trouble again as in the 1930's, there won't be enough aristocrats riding in Continentals to rescue it. Let us hope that, in spite of the prevailing conservatism, there will be enough radical egg-heads riding in Volkswagens or on public buses.

* * *

And now, after this long rambling tour through American universities, I come back at last to Canada. If everyone is not by this time too unendurably bored by discussions of the significance of June 10, 1957, and March 31,

³³My italics.

³⁴My italics.

1958, there are a few things that I should like to say about these two Conservative victories.

In the first place they have not restored anything which can properly be called a two-party system in the classical sense of the term. In a normal healthy two-party system the two parties alternate in office with reasonable frequency, the successful party not getting more than about 55 per cent of the popular vote and the unsuccessful party not sinking below 45 per cent. As far as we Canadians are concerned, the two-party system in this classical sense is only a sort of political Garden of Eden towards which our newspaper editors and our university political scientists yearn nostalgically. But an angry God drove us out of this Eden after 1918, and it is mostly wishful thinking that sees us now being readmitted to it.

What Mr. Mackenzie King established was a one-party domination at Ottawa with two or three splinter groups pathetically posing as opponents of the leviathan in office. His governmental party, which called itself Liberal, so blanketed the centre in politics and spread out so far both to the left and to the right, that the opposition groups seemed to become more and more ineffective. On the night of June 10, 1957, I thought that the significance of that election was that Mackenzie King was at last dead. But since March 31, 1958, we have had established at Ottawa another governmental party, calling itself Progressive Conservative this time, still more overwhelmingly blanketing the centre and spreading out to left and right. I should guess that the seeming unanimity of the Canadian people in sending majorities to support this governmental party from all sections of the community must surely be deceptive. No free people ever agree to this overwhelming extent on anything important, except sometimes when they are facing an invading enemy. Still there the new government is, in office with 208 supporters and a weaker opposition than we have ever known.

The complement to the Mackenzie King system was the development of the habit by the Canadian people of locating Her Majesty's Opposition (since free countries must have an Opposition) not in Ottawa but in the provincial capitals. Before 1957 the Social Credit governments in British Columbia and Alberta, the C.C.F. government in Saskatchewan, the Conservative governments in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, and the Union Nationale government in Quebec formed our effective Opposition. Maybe, when the first fine careless rapture of the post-March 31 situation has passed, our provincial electorates will begin to move towards opposition again.

The Mackenzie King system seems to me to have been a bad way of conducting national democratic politics. Reflection upon it drives me into poetry—the poetry of Frank Scott.³⁵

He blunted us.

We had no shape

Because he never took sides,

³⁵F. R. Scott, "W.L.M.K.," *The Eye of the Needle* (Contact Press, Montreal, 1957), p. 21.

And no sides
 Because he never allowed them to take shape.
 He skilfully avoided what was wrong
 Without saying what was right,
 And never let his on the one hand
 Know what his on the other hand was doing. . . .
 He seemed to be in the centre,
 Because we had no centre,
 No vision
 To pierce the smoke-screen of his politics.
 Truly he will be remembered
 Wherever men honour ingenuity,
 Ambiguity, inactivity, and political longevity.

However, let us admit that, just as all Canadian cities³⁶ as they grow older and bigger tend to become more and more like Toronto—"If they are good," said Rupert Brooke, "they may become Toronto"—so all Canadian statesmen, as they grow older in office, tend to become more and more like Mackenzie King. In addition, though new governments always look dynamic, all Canadian governmental parties, the longer they are in office, tend to become more and more like the Mackenzie King party. This is the secret of success, the *arcanum imperii* of Canadian politics. It means, of course, that a governmental party in office at Ottawa is seldom liberal or conservative in any sense that would be intelligible to political philosophers. It is simply governmental.

Does any force loom up as likely to check these tendencies to which I have been drawing attention? A revived Liberal party, which is also liberal with a small l? I am unable to peer so far into the future. A new Canadian Labour Congress party? A party of the centre without an ideology is, of course, the recipe for success in Canada. But a party of the left without an ideology should have been strangled at birth.

However, I started off long ago to talk about the new conservative breezes blowing across university campuses rather than about these practical politicians who are so much less interesting than politically minded intellectuals.

In our country there has as yet been nothing comparable to the American outpouring of books and articles by academic conservatives or academic revisionist liberals. The Canadian Conservative party seems to have achieved office largely without help from the egg-heads; and the advisers whom it summons to Ottawa come from the advertising agencies rather than the universities. But there have been a good many signs that the intellectual weather, which in North America starts south of the Great Lakes and the 49th Parallel and moves northward, is beginning to change in Canada as it has already changed to the south of us.

The Gordon Report, for example, which was produced for a Liberal government after several years of research work by trained professional economists, has been greeted by such authorities on liberalism as the London

³⁶I mean English-Canadian cities.

Economist and the *Winnipeg Free Press* as more a Conservative document than a Liberal one.

Hilda Neatby's *So Little For the Mind*³⁷ represented a conservative revival in one sector of our national life, that of education, some years before such tendencies had shown themselves in our politics. It was interesting that her indictment of Canadian educational theories and practices should be so similar to that which an American historian, Professor Arthur Bestor, had been making for some time in learned circles in the United States, and which Professor Bestor is now repeating for a popular audience in the pages of *Good Housekeeping*—a sign, I take it, that the Bestor campaign must be winning in the United States. But maybe in this field the Russian Sputnik has been more influential than either Bestor or Neatby.

Also, on Saturday, January 11, 1958, I read on the literary page of the *Toronto Globe and Mail* that Mr. Ernest Watkins of Calgary is writing the authorized life of the late Lord Bennett. "Far too long," Mr. Watkins was reported as saying, "Liberals have been writing their own version of the political history of the past fifty years. I would like to bury the partisanship and show R. B. Bennett as he was, a very great man by any standard." This strikes me as a rather conservative way of burying the partisanship.

More recently, in the issue of *Maclean's* of April 26, 1958, Bruce Hutchison, a Liberal journalist, inquired "Is Democracy Obsolete?" in an article that repeats and vulgarizes the criticisms of modern political democracy which Walter Lippmann has been making for the last thirty years.

Perhaps more significant than any of these signs just mentioned, there appeared within the last year the neo-Tory manifesto, *Freedom Wears a Crown*, by the late John Farthing.³⁸ Although this book has been highly praised by competent reviewers, I must say that it seems to me a rather silly performance. Mr. Farthing wanted to awaken us to the truth, as he saw it, that it is primarily our monarchical institutions which have preserved us as an individual Canadian entity in North America and as a free people—in itself, an arguable proposition. His book, however, in its anti-liberalism is Jacobite rather than Conservative. The monarchy he worshipped was the pre-Whig monarchy of the Tudors and Stuarts; he yearned to eliminate most of English history between Elizabeth I and Elizabeth II. But the monarchy which we actually inherited in Canada as a British community after 1763 was the monarchy which developed after the Whig revolution of 1688. Mr. Farthing so detested Whiggism that he couldn't see the difference between it and republicanism, a failing which rather puts him out of court as a student of British history.

Nor could he understand Canadian nationalism as anything but a purely separatist movement. Surely a student who cannot understand that Canadian Whigs and Liberals in extending the scope of national self-government were not destroying the connection with Britain but were only changing its

³⁷Toronto, 1953.

³⁸Toronto, 1957.

nature—and both Macdonald and Borden contributed greatly to this process of change—surely such a student is not qualified to pass judgments about Canadian history. But Mr. Farthing has not, of course, been the first Canadian Conservative, nor will he be the last, who couldn't comprehend about our British connection (and other institutions) that *plus c'est la même chose, plus ça change*. Also, through most of the Farthing book one can hear very clearly certain overtones of anti-French-Canadianism which suggest a very ancient type of Toryism in Canada but one that is not viable in the twentieth century.

Finally, there is the chief intellectual prophet of Canadian Conservatism, Professor Donald Creighton. As one rereads his writings today one is struck by the theme that runs through them from the start, of the business class as the chosen instrument of destiny in Canada, the creative element in the making of Canada—a Canada separated from the United States and engaged in a constant struggle of competitive coexistence with the Americans, a Canada tied to Britain and Europe by tradition, economic bonds, and deliberate choice. One is struck also by the frequency with which the adjective “parochial” appears when he refers to agrarian opponents of these capitalist *entrepreneurs*, whether they were the leaders of French-Canadian habitants or of Upper-Canadian yeomen. His picture of Macdonald, the young Conservative politician and the old Conservative chieftain, is an artistic triumph. But as a work of history it would be much more impressive, at least to me, did I not so often discover in its pages that those political leaders who collided with Macdonald were not only intellectually deficient and morally delinquent but also physically repulsive.

As to the blast delivered a year ago by Professor Creighton in his presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association, no doubt some of its fire and thunder could be attributed to his holy joy at the Conservative election victory that had just preceded it. His pathological determination to identify liberals with Marxians because both talk about class struggles, his fondness for discovering diabolical conspiracies between evil liberal historians and evil liberal sociologists (the historians being evil because they are liberals and the sociologists being evil because they are sociologists), this sort of stuff is not history, it is not even good Toronto journalism. On the whole Professor Creighton's anti-liberalism and anti-Americanism strike me as being too apoplectic to give much intellectual assistance to the smooth public-relations team who are introducing the new Conservatism in the form of practical politics at Ottawa.

In the meantime, while we await more of the new conservative history and political science, let us remind ourselves that there has been so much liberal writing in these fields because the Canadian tradition has been so essentially a liberal one. The experiment in which two communal groups, French and English, learned how to live together peaceably, and to co-operate politically, was a liberal one. The evolution of self-government from colonial dependency to independent nation, which has taken place without

breaking the bonds with Britain, has been a liberal process in the tradition of English parliamentary government. Conservatives cannot now try to monopolize the cause of monarchy or of the British connection without doing violence to the facts; because Canadians on the left, with the exception of a small handful, have not been republicans or separatists.

As to the future, Canada certainly needs some countervailing force to balance against twentieth-century American pressures. But it will not be found by falling back nostalgically on the nineteenth-century British connection. For in the North Atlantic triangle of forces, Britain can no longer pull the weight which she pulled in the nineteenth century. To achieve an effective balance against the weight of the United States we need an enlarged counterweight across the Atlantic. This means some effective form of closer union between Britain and Western Europe. British Conservative statesmen have recognized this and have been moving in the European direction. Sooner or later Canadian Conservatives will have to recognize it also.


The conservatism, however, which I really fear is coming in Canadian universities is not that which will concern itself specifically with any of these problems. Our universities are going through an evolution which seems inevitable but which is also dangerous. Facing the coming crisis of the barbarian invasion of thousands of extra students from the high schools, they are grasping eagerly at any financial help they can get from governments and from big business corporations. They do not seem to be worried much about the subtle moral obligations in which they may be entangled by becoming so openly and voluntarily dependent upon the Canadian Establishment. If university life is healthy, there should always be a certain tension between the university and the community around it—just as there should be a certain tension between the church and its community. The university is one institution in our society which will certainly die if it becomes socially too well adjusted.

But our university presidents are doing a magnificent publicity job of picturing their universities to big business and to big government as institutions in which the teachers, scholars, and scientists are safe, right-thinking conformists, very much like the presidents themselves. Since scholars and scientists can get little research done nowadays without being subsidized by some organ of the Establishment, there is a danger that this picture may become only too true. Our universities will be staffed mainly by professors in gray flannel suits, suits which they can at last afford on the new, more generous salary scales. We are all dedicated today to the task of producing bigger and better egg-heads; but in the coming era they are likely to be egg-heads acceptable to the Establishment.

To this problem, a problem which official university leadership would maintain does not exist, I do not know the answer. But in spite of the brave new conservative world that I see coming, I still keep up some hopes. Just when everybody has been successfully adjusted socially, some innocent young

savage will find his way one day into the stacks of some university library. And he will accidentally come across the writings of John Stuart Mill or Bertrand Russell or Uncle Charlie Beard or of some younger rebel like C. Wright Mills. At that moment a liberal political movement will start all over again.





The Mountain Family Circle: A Study in Canadian Urban Culture

D. C. MASTERS, F.R.S.C.

SUSANNA Moodie concluded her volume, *Roughing It in the Bush*, published in 1852, with these words, "If these sketches should prove the means of deterring one family from sinking their property, and shipwrecking all their hopes, by going to reside in the backwoods of Canada, I shall consider myself amply repaid for revealing the secrets of the prison-house, and feel that I have not toiled and suffered in the wilderness in vain." There is no doubt that Mrs. Moodie's grim picture of the frontier in the middle part of the nineteenth century is largely true. However, there was a pleasanter side to Canadian society in this period: life in the cities and towns such as Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and Toronto.

The story of the Mountain family circle in Quebec provides a good example of this urban society. In 1814, a young clergyman, George Jehoshaphat Mountain (1789-1863), married Mary Hume Thomson (1789-1861), the daughter of a British official, in Quebec. Her elder sister had married a young captain of engineers, Gustavus Nicolls (1779-1860), in 1812. Both families prospered and their fortunes were closely associated with the city of Quebec. In 1837 Mountain became Bishop of Quebec.¹ Gustavus Nicolls was Commander of Royal Engineers in Canada (1814-16), in Nova Scotia (1824-32) and at Quebec (1832-7). The Mountains had five children, Elizabeth (1815-77), Harriet (1816-93), Armine (1823-85), Jacob (1825-50), and Kate (1830-86). There were five Nicolls sons. Armine Mountain entered the church. Jacob Mountain secured a commission in the British army, but died at the age of twenty-five. Four of the Nicolls boys entered the army. Jasper, the third Nicolls son, took holy orders and became the first principal of Bishop's College, Lennoxville, in 1845. Two years later he married his first cousin, Harriet Mountain.

The Mountains were a more literary family than most of their Quebec friends. The English world of letters was their world. Jasper, the Bishop's son-in-law, was at Oriel in Newman's time and frequently heard him preach. He knew Benjamin Jowett, the famous Master of Balliol, and breakfasted with Mark Pattison just after Pattison had become a fellow of Lincoln.²

¹Mountain was technically Bishop of Montreal, having been consecrated under that title as suffragan under Bishop C. J. Stewart in 1836. He succeeded Stewart in effect as Bishop of Quebec in 1837 and became officially Bishop of Quebec in 1850.

²Nicolls Papers (at Bishop's University). Jasper Nicolls' Diary, May 30, 1838, Aug. 3, 1840, Dec. 2, 1840. Subsequent references are to the Nicolls Papers unless otherwise specified.

Armine, who had studied at Oxford, was a friend of Thomas Arnold, the younger brother of Matthew Arnold. Armine took a walking tour of the Lake Country in the autumn of 1844 and wrote, "We passed by Wordsworth's house at Rydal, which the coach guard is so much in the habit of pointing out to passengers, that one of the Miss Arnolds told me that he was seen to stretch out his arm, when he passed with an empty coach!"³

The Mountains were familiar with many of the English classics. They knew Shakespeare well enough to be able to quote him to each other. When Jacob fell in love with one of his English cousins who did not return his affection Mrs. Mountain wrote to Harriet, "As General Nicolls used to say 'Men have died—and worms have eaten them but not for love.'"⁴ The Bishop described an obstinate acquaintance as "very determined and as little likely to yield as Petruchio was to Catherine in the contest about sunshine or moon-shine."⁵ The Mountains had a pair of horses which they originally named Othello and Ophelia. They were too good Shakespearians to let it go at that, however, and Ophelia was renamed Desdemona.⁶

There are references in the Mountain correspondence to eighteenth-century writers: Swift, Goldsmith, and Edward Young. It was inevitable that, when Armine was appointed to a curacy at £40 a year, Mrs. Mountain should describe him as "passing rich." Mrs. Mountain was particularly fond of Edward Young, the author of *Night Thoughts*, to whom she referred as "my friend Young" and "my poet."⁷ Jasper's library contained *Night Thoughts* which he had received from the Mountains, and also two volumes of the *Spectator*. Elizabeth Mountain was given a volume of Dr. Johnson's *Rasselas*. Jasper presented his eldest son with four volumes of the *Rambler*.⁸

The Bishop and Armine both read the Waverley novels.⁹ Jasper and Harriet had a set at Lennoxville and Jasper expressed regret in 1853 that two were "absent without leave."¹⁰ Frances Mountain, one of the English cousins, read Lockhart's *Life of Scott* shortly after its publication in 1837, and was pleased to find that Scott shared her dislike of Edward Waverley, the hero of his first novel. Young and romantic, Frances could not forgive Waverley for transferring his affections from the magnificent but unresponsive Flora MacIvor to Rose Bradwardine.¹¹

The Mountains were familiar with other nineteenth-century writers. The letters contain references to Byron, Macaulay, Felicia Hemans, Schiller, and

³Armine to Harriet, Nov. 14, 1844.

⁴Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Feb. 16, 1849. *As You Like It*, Act IV, Scene I.

⁵Bishop Mountain to Mrs. Mountain, June 20, 1860. *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act IV, Scene V.

⁶Kate to Harriet, May 20, 1848.

⁷Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Feb. 11, 1848; Nov. 27, 1852; Jan. 5, 1855.

⁸These volumes (Young, Johnson, and the *Spectator*) are in Bishop's University Library.

⁹Bishop Mountain to Harriet, July 11, 1834; Armine to Harriet, May 8, no year.

¹⁰Jasper to Harriet, Oct. 26, 1853.

¹¹Frances Mountain to Harriet, March 5, 1838.

John Henry Newman.¹² "Though I like Mr. Newman's sermons, and think he must be an excellent man," wrote Mrs. Mountain to Jasper on April 6, 1841, "I think there must be *something wrong* in *some* of his opinions, when *so much error, as you confess*, arises from a party of which he is the *main spring*." Mrs. Mountain assured Harriet that, "We all admire Longfellow." She thought his poem, "Recognition" very beautiful but was somewhat shaken by his conclusion about the child "growing up" in Heaven.¹³

The Mountains read the works of many minor contemporary writers such as Frederick Marryatt and W. H. G. Kingston.¹⁴ They entertained Kingston and his bride when they were on their wedding-tour in Canada in 1853-4. Many of the writers mentioned in the Papers have been almost forgotten. There are references to Hugh Miller, the Scottish geologist and author (1802-56), F. W. Newman, the Cardinal's brother who ended his life as a Unitarian, S. C. Fairfield, the American author and poet (1803-44), and Samuel Warren (1807-77), the English novelist.¹⁵ Mrs. Mountain had a great deal to say about Martin Farquhar Tupper, an English poet who had an immense popularity in Great Britain and the United States. According to the *Encyclopedia Americana* readers either made fun of Tupper or regarded him as having eclipsed Solomon. Mrs. Mountain inclined to the latter view and asserted that "he is so wonderful and so clever and so excellent withall that his blemishes, *if* he has *any*, are cast into impenetrable shade, too dense for my dull vision."¹⁶

The Mountains were familiar with many of the magazines and the religious periodicals of the age including the *Illustrated London News*, Gladstone's paper the *Guardian*, the *British Critic*, and the *British Magazine*.¹⁷

The Mountain family circle not only read the works of other people, but also wrote themselves. Bishop Mountain published the journal of his visit of 1844 to Red River.¹⁸ He was also a poet of some significance and has been included in A. J. M. Smith's *Book of Canadian Poetry*. He published a volume of poetry entitled *Songs of the Wilderness* in 1846, which consisted of narrative poems and sonnets describing the scenery, the Indians, and the French-Canadian voyageurs observed on his journey to Red River. A decided strain of Christian theology was woven into the poetry. The explana-

¹²Jacob to Harriet, March 27, 1843; Armine to Jasper, June 8, 1862; Frances to Harriet, June 29, 1839.

¹³Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Oct. 8, Oct. 15 [1852].

¹⁴Kate to Harriet, March 8, 1856; Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Nov. 3, 1848; M. R. Kingsford, *The Life, Work and Influence of William Henry Giles Kingston* (Toronto, 1947), p. 88.

¹⁵S. C. Sewell to Jasper, Aug. 20, 1852, Oct. 28, 1852; Kate to Harriet, Dec., 1848; Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, March 31, 1848.

¹⁶Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Nov. 22, Dec. 20, 1850.

¹⁷Armine to Harriet, Friday 30th, 1849; General Nicolls to Jasper, Nov. 10, 1854.

¹⁸*The Journal of the Bishop of Montreal during a Visit to the Church Missionary Society's North-West America Mission* (London, 1845).

tory notes in the volume contained additional descriptive material including notes on Canadian wild flowers, the voyageur, and the Kakabeka rainbow. Armine wrote a life of his father entitled *A Memoir of George Jehoshaphat Mountain* (Montreal, 1866). It was a lucid, coherent, and restrained piece of work.

These printed volumes form only a small part of the literary productions of the family. They all wrote extensively for their own amusement. When Elizabeth and Harriet Mountain were twelve and eleven they gave their mother a birthday present accompanied by a verse which began bravely,

We had intended, kind Mama
As far as we are able
For this dear day, to help Papa
To buy a nice work-table.

Their effort a year later, set to the tune of the "Last Rose of Summer," was decidedly more mature.

It was in their correspondence that the family best displayed their literary abilities. To the Mountains letters were not only a means of communication, they were also a creative art. Their letters included vigorous narrative passages and a good deal of literary criticism as well as family and community gossip and friendly badinage. Harriet and her mother wrote regular and frequent letters to each other, some of them running to sixteen pages. Members of the family on extended travels used the journal type of letter in which the writer completed one or two pages each day and sent them off about once a week. Armine during his trip in England and Scotland in the 1840's and Gustavus, Jasper's son, who was in England in the 1860's and 1870's, employed the journal form of letter.

In the nineteenth century the men studied Latin and Greek but these were considered unsuitable for the female mind. If the girls wished to learn foreign languages they cultivated the Romance languages and German. Louisa M. Alcott wrote in the *Old Fashioned Girl*, published in 1869, "Fanny went to a fashionable school, where the young ladies were so busy with their French, German and Italian, that there was no time for good English." Except that they did not neglect English, the Mountain and Nicolls families were in this tradition. The Nicolls boys commenced the study of Latin grammar at the age of seven.¹⁹ The Bishop, Armine, and Jasper all had classical university educations. Harriet, Kate, and their friends studied Italian, French, and German. Harriet knew enough French to comment on the differences between Gaspé French and that spoken in other parts of Quebec. In the journal of her trip to the Gaspé with her father in 1840, she reported, "The language which they speak is very unlike the French which is spoken by the Canadians and sounded to me like a mixture of Indian and Spanish. The difference however is more in the tone and pronunciation than the actual words which when I listened I could easily comprehend." Kate, studying Italian when she was eighteen, made

¹⁹General Nicolls to Jasper, June 8, 1854.

facetious references to the language, heading her letters to Harriet, Monda, Tuesda, and even Dearestest Seraphica Gaspara, Falcone. She referred to Kate Nicolls, five weeks old, as "a fanciulletta of thirty-six days."²⁰ The baby name for Kate Nicolls, used by the whole family connection, was Piccolina. In 1856 Kate Mountain was busy reading Italian as well as German plays with her friends.²¹

The Bishop wrote poems in Latin, chiefly translations from English and Greek, and also French and Italian verse.²² He spoke French with facility. In October, 1848, he and four Frenchmen from among his clergy performed an ordination service in French at Christieville.²³ On one occasion he had a long conversation in French with a young Jerseyman whom he wished to dissuade from abandoning the Anglican faith.²⁴

Music played a great part in the lives of the Mountains. This was largely a result of their close association with the church, but they were interested in secular music also. When Armine had been seen walking with Miss Fulford, daughter of the Bishop of Montreal, Mrs. Mountain sniffed, "but she cannot *sing* or even *play*—so he says—she will not do for him."²⁵

Armine, Kate, Harriet, and Jasper were all active musicians. Each of them played the pipe organ and the piano and all but Harriet sang.²⁶ Jasper wrote psalm tunes.²⁷ He was also a violinist and used to play solos, with Harriet as his accompanist. Eventually he gave up the violin for fear the students at Bishop's would regard him as "fiddling," a practice somewhat in disrepute in the nineteenth century.²⁸ Kate assisted in the music of the Cathedral and of the other Anglican churches in the Quebec area, as organist, singer, and, at times, as choir director. Kate's skill at the organ was attested by Frances Monck, the sister-in-law of the Governor General, who wrote in 1865, "Yesterday, after lunch, I drove to hear Miss Mountain play the organ, which she did most beautifully."²⁹ There are a good many references in Kate's letters to the music at the Cathedral. "We don't make much difference in the Cathedral in the singing on Christmas day," she wrote to Harriet in 1856, "We don't have more than on Sundays—but the anthem is appropriate 'For unto us'—and we have the Hallelujah chorus after the sermon on that Day—We have it 4 times a year—We sing a great many anthems from the Messiah. This month we are to have 'And the glory' 'Lift up your Heads' 'O Thou that tellest.'"³⁰ Kate conducted a German choir

²⁰Kate to Harriet, Nov. 8, 1849.

²¹Kate to Harriet, March 8, 1856.

²²Appendix to *Memoir of G. J. Mountain*.

²³Bishop to Harriet, Oct. 21, 1848.

²⁴Bishop to Mrs. Mountain, Aug. 26, 1852.

²⁵Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Oct. 11, 1850.

²⁶Armine to Harriet, Sept. 30, 1842.

²⁷Jasper to Harriet, Nov. 16, 1853.

²⁸Bishop Mountain to Jasper, Feb. 7, 1848; General Nicolls to Jasper, Nov. 10, 1848.

²⁹Frances E. O. Monck, *My Canadian Leaves* (London, 1891), p. 364. Bishop Mountain to Harriet, May 4, 1855 or 1856.

³⁰Kate to Harriet, Jan. 3, 1856.

at Trinity Chapel.³¹ She also played the piano for admirers from the British garrison. When he was on a visit to Quebec in 1852 Jasper reported to Harriet, "On my return found Kate playing, with her captain at her elbow. She looked up over her music, and said something, or nothing, which was all the introduction we had."³²

Visiting cousins from England performed from time to time and were regarded with a critical eye. Kate wrote in 1849, "Georgie sings a little but has not much voice and does not I think play well at all, a great rattle and scramble and a great deal of thumping and such bad time she keeps and so does Mary who sings Mama says just like Georgie."³³ Kate was a just critic who could appreciate good musicianship. This is indicated by her letter of December 8, 1849, to Harriet describing the playing of a Miss Lunn, a visitor from Montreal. Kate wrote, "She was delighted with our piano and played several pieces on it. One of them was the thing that Greene used to play (that you copied and sent me) with brilliant variations. I never saw anything like the way that she ran up and down in octaves with her left hand and so softly too."

Kate and a small group met at their respective homes for music and sometimes for dancing. "We went to the LeMesuriers in the evening from nine till one-thirty," she wrote on May 20, 1848. "They had dancing and singing in honour of a beautiful new piano which by a spring you can make one two three four five or six notes lower. Mr. Gray [of the British garrison] sang a beautiful duett from "anoni la tromba."

Spencerwood, the vice-regal residence, was the scene of a number of concerts and musical entertainments. The Mountain letters contain the programme of a concert at Spencerwood on April 26, 1855. It included numbers by the band of the Sixteenth Regiment, a flute and clarionet duet by members of the band, and vocal selections given by the ladies of Quebec and by officers from the garrison. The Misses Mountain, Ashworth, and LeMesurier contributed a glee, "Sisters of the Sea."

An occasional celebrity was heard by the Mountains or by the Nicolls either in England or in Quebec. Armine went to a number of concerts in England in the 1840's and heard Sigismund Thalberg, the famous Swiss pianist.³⁴ General Nicolls heard Jenny Lind in November, 1848, and reported, "we . . . were quite delighted with the power and sweetness of her voice."³⁵ Adelina Patti, the great opera singer, was in Quebec in 1861.³⁶ Also in Quebec was a German named Krauss who was described by Kate as a great singer. He had taught Queen Victoria for a short time and reported to the Mountains, "She has leetle voice six seven note."³⁷

³¹Kate to Harriet, c. 1857.

³²Jasper to Harriet, Sept. 23, 1852.

³³Kate to Harriet, Sept. 15, 1849.

³⁴Armine to Harriet, March 3, 1842, Sept. 1 and Sept. 30, 1842.

³⁵General Nicolls to Jasper, Nov. 10, 1848.

³⁶Kate to Harriet, July 10, 1861.

³⁷Kate to Harriet, Sept. 22, 1849.

Painting, a fashionable accomplishment of the leisured classes, figured to some extent in the lives of the Mountains and their friends. Harriet made sketches around Quebec in the 1840's and sent them to Armine in England.³⁸ Some of the officers in the garrison made paintings and sketches of the Quebec scenery. Kate mentioned a Captain Hallewell of the 19th who drew exquisitely and who intended to present pictures of Niagara Falls and of Quebec to the Queen.³⁹ Not all the officers had equal talent. Kate wrote to Harriet in 1850, "we had Mr. Daines sketches of the day handed round & they were the most awful productions I ever saw, in number about *twenty*. Mr Hastings was determined that we should all see them all—& I was so uncomfortable, trying in vain to recognize some of the places, as the poor wretch was sitting there waiting to have them praised—at last I said 'I think I know this place'. & was trying to give a guess, as it was an under-terminated looking thing—when that wicked Mr. Hastings called out 'Oh but you have got it up side down.'"⁴⁰ Kate contemplated taking drawing lessons along with her friends, the Price girls, in 1856 but she rather lost her enthusiasm when she found that while the teacher's water-colour sketches were "very pretty—bold and free" he had not an idea of drawing animals and figures.⁴¹

Kate and Harriet were both keen gardeners. At Lennoxville Harriet grew St. George roses and red phlox. At Quebec Kate carried on the garden which Harriet had developed before her marriage. It contained *convolvulus major* (morning glory), sweet peas, and golden poppy. Kate was anxious that Harriet should ask Mrs. Nicolls Senior to send some seeds from England for the two gardens. She reported that all the gentlemen in Quebec who kept nice gardens imported their seeds from England.⁴²

According to Amelia Murray who was a British visitor at Spencerwood in 1854, "The Canadian ladies certainly amuse themselves more easily and pleasantly than we do; they are more like the French, in their enjoyment of passing moments, and are generally pretty, natural, and well dressed."⁴³ Much of the enjoyment consisted in dancing. The young people at Quebec did the fashionable dances of the period, particularly the quadrille and the polka. Frances Monck reported in 1864, "At French parties there are no fast dances, all quadrilles and lancers, it seems odd."⁴⁴ Kate and her friends sometimes danced at their respective homes. At a private party in June, 1849, Kate danced "La Plongeuse," a traditional French-Canadian dance in which each couple held a handkerchief and went alternately over and under the next couple. More exciting were the military balls given by the

³⁸Armine to Harriet, Aug. 2, 1842.

³⁹Kate to Harriet, Sept. 22, 1849.

⁴⁰Kate to Harriet, June 1, 1850.

⁴¹Kate to Harriet, Feb. 29, 1856.

⁴²Kate to Harriet, June 15, 1849. Also, Kate to Harriet, April 26, 1849, Dec. 8, 1849.

⁴³Hon. Amelia M. Murray, *Letters from the United States, Cuba and Canada* (New York, 1856), p. 83.

⁴⁴Monck, *My Canadian Leaves*, p. 182.

garrison at the Citadel. Kate's first ball was on May 24, 1848, when she was eighteen and the Bishop had to be sounded out days in advance as to whether she could go. Kate wore white tarlatan with a white sash and her hair was put up. The evening was a huge success.⁴⁵ Kate had a lower opinion of dances at the vice-regal residence, Spencerwood. They were more democratic and one encountered all sorts of people. In a letter written in the 1850's she reported,

There was a great Ball at Spencer Wood on Tuesday and I went to it with the Ashworths. The chief fun was looking at the crowds of extraordinary people who were assembled there. Some of the dresses were most original and the style of dancing equally so. One woman who was my vis-à-vis in a quadrille did all her steps in such a determined way that it kept me in fits. She just looked as if she was saying to herself that she had not taken dancing lessons for nothing.

Armine, the Bishop, and Kate frequently dined out. Often the entertainment after dinner consisted of music. Sometimes the young folk danced or played charades. At one time there was quite a rage for a practice which Kate called "galvanizing" or "biologizing." Apparently the victim selected was given a mild electric shock; but the technical details are obscure. "I like being galvanized so much," wrote Kate on April 29, 1848, "Little Colville was afraid at first and at last they persuaded him to take it with me—and William [Campbell] gave it so strong that it bent the bones of my arms almost—and the little wretch would not let go my hand."⁴⁶

Horses, carriages, and sleighs were to the Mountains an essential means of transportation and a source of pleasure. Driving provided local transportation in the Quebec area and to and from Springfield, their country home. The Bishop drove around the diocese, sometimes in very adverse weather conditions. In December, 1849, Jasper drove a horse and sleigh from Lennoxville to Levis, a distance of 125 miles, in fifty and one-half hours.⁴⁷ The Mountains drove a coach in the Quebec area, but in the more rural atmosphere of Lennoxville another type of vehicle was permissible. "I am glad to hear that you have got a headed wagon," wrote the General to Harriet on November 10, 1848, "'tis much more suitable to a Family." Kate was given a carriage for her birthday in 1848. The following year she exchanged it for a more expensive one which she described as "a little beauty with a little seat behind and quite light."⁴⁸ Jasper wrote that in the Eastern Townships they all used sleighs "of the Yankee build" which were several inches wider than the French-Canadian trains and carriages.⁴⁹ Kate was very proud of her ability as a driver. Once at a party she had a discussion

⁴⁵Kate to Harriet, May 27, 1848; Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, May 26, 1848. See also Kate to Harriet, Dec. 29, 1849, April 13, 1850; Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Jan. 1, 1850.

⁴⁶See also Kate to Harriet, May 5, 1848, April 13, 1850; Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, May 12, 1848.

⁴⁷Public Archives of Canada, S.P.G. F.P. Quebec 1850-9, Jasper Nicolls to the Rev. E. Hawkins, Jan. 28, 1850.

⁴⁸Kate to Harriet, Dec. 8, 1849.

⁴⁹Jasper to E. Hawkins, Jan. 28, 1850.

with one of her officer friends on the subject of double ring snaffles.⁵⁰ In spite of Kate's high opinion of her own driving ability there were times when some disagreed. She was suitably annoyed when "that impudent Dr. Sewell" enquired angrily if Mrs. Mountain's life was ensured while Kate was driving her to the country. On another occasion, a Mr. Murray threatened to fine Kate for driving without bells after she had driven past him very quickly and frightened his pony.⁵¹ The Mountains were also keen riders. The Bishop used to ride with Harriet prior to her marriage.⁵² Afterward he proposed that he and Armine should ride with Kate.⁵³

In the winter Quebec provided its characteristic sports. Kate skated at the rink which at first was in the Lower Town ("and a bore") but later in the Upper Town "just outside the works."⁵⁴ Sometimes there was skating on the river. On March 3, 1849, Kate reported, "We drove down Thursday morning below the point, skated some time there and then some time at a large piece of beautiful ice near the shore some way down the Isle D'Orleans—The last rain has taken all the snow off the ice. It's as clear as glass and as blue as the sky."⁵⁵

There were snow-shoe races between members of the garrison.⁵⁶ In March, 1849, a party of the Mountains and their friends witnessed a great curling match between the 79th Regiment and the Quebec citizens.⁵⁷ In March, 1854, Kate saw an exciting battle staged by the garrison for possession of a snow fort at Spencerwood. The fort was defended by 100 men and attacked by a force of 800. After being twice repulsed the attackers finally captured the fort.⁵⁸

In the letters of the Mountains and the Nicolls there are many glimpses of the material aspects of life at Quebec. Gas lighting was being installed in the town in 1848. On November 10, Kate reported that there were gas lamps in St. Louis, St. Anne, and St. John streets and that they were to be lighted for the first time on December 1. A great number of people were having it brought into their houses. In March, 1849, Kate sent her first message by telegraph.⁵⁹

There are many references to clothes. In the 1840's Mrs. Mountain, who was spending a vacation at Nicolet, wrote to Harriet at Quebec giving her detailed instructions about the purchase of a Tuscan straw bonnet for a friend.⁶⁰ It was to have a plain ribbon, a curtain and small bow behind

⁵⁰Kate to Harriet, Feb. 10, 1849.

⁵¹Kate to Harriet, Oct. 14, 1848, Nov. 25, 1848.

⁵²Bishop Mountain to Harriet, May 2, 1848.

⁵³Bishop Mountain to Harriet, Oct. 2, 1851.

⁵⁴Kate to Harriet, n.d.

⁵⁵See also Kate to Harriet, Feb. 17, 1849.

⁵⁶Kate to Harriet, Feb. 27, 1854.

⁵⁷Kate to Harriet, March 3, 1849.

⁵⁸Kate to Harriet, March 24, 1854.

⁵⁹Kate to Harriet, March 10, 1849.

⁶⁰Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, July 1, 1841 or 1847.

or at the side, and was to have nice ears sewed into it. "Do not let the bonnet be *too* small in front," wrote Mrs. Mountain, "a nice, snug cottage shape." In 1858 Edmund Nicolls, Jasper's brother, wrote from England asking Jasper to purchase two pair of men's moccasins "three pair ditto for a lady."⁶¹ Kate was having a dress made for Harriet and wrote on April 19, 1856, "The sleeves of your gown are as plain as I could get her to make them. If I had not said a good deal about them you would have been furbellowed and frillbowed to twice the extent that you are. . . . You should see the women here! . . . They look all arms."

Styles of hair-dressing called for occasional comment. Armine reported to Harriet that one of the aunts in Edinburgh had adopted "the disgusting fashion of wearing her hair straight down by the side of her face withal surmounted by a *cap*."⁶² Kate thought that the best choice for bridesmaid in a coming wedding would be a young lady "who now wears her hair in long ringlets (when in curls and tails when not) all over her cloak down her Back."⁶³ In 1855, Jasper reported that Kate and one of her cousins, "have got their hair tucked away in rolls behind their ears, and no 'back hair' (vide the Miss Smythes of Lennoxville) which makes them appear different."⁶⁴

Mrs. Mountain and Kate made many references to food in their letters. The Mountains were very fond of maple sugar and regarded maple sugar from the Eastern Townships as an acceptable substitute for cane sugar. Mrs. Mountain called it "your double refined Township maple sugar" and continued, "It is very white and quite without, I think, that peculiar taste which makes maple sugar so *nice* to eat and so *nasty* to sweeten tea with."⁶⁵ On another occasion Mrs. Mountain wrote, "By the bye about Spruce Beer. Your hint has made me determine in future to brew it *at home if I can*."⁶⁶ Kate wrote a facetious story in 1849 entitled "The Baneful Effect of Lemon Pudding on Hasty Pudding."⁶⁷ Corned pork was a staple in the homes of the poor but even wealthier families knew the intricate art of salting pork. On December 7, 1850, Mrs. Mountain wrote a long dissertation to Harriet on the delicate task of pickling pig so that it would be neither too salt to taste nor too fresh to keep well. Even at Christmas time the Mountains had corned pork as well as turkey. On September 7, 1849, Harriet's wedding anniversary, Mrs. Mountain reported that she had gone upstairs to see a visitor while the rest of the family were concluding their blueberry pudding. She continued, "but Armine charged me to return speedily! as they could not drink your Wedding day! . . . without me."⁶⁸

⁶¹Jasper to Harriet, Aug. 11, 1850.

⁶²Armine to Harriet, July 2, 1841.

⁶³Kate to Harriet, March 24, 1854.

⁶⁴Jasper to Harriet, Jan. 10, 1855.

⁶⁵Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, April 21, 1848.

⁶⁶Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Sept. 14 (probably 1841!).

⁶⁷Kate to Harriet, March 16, 1849.

⁶⁸Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Sept. 7 and 8, 1849.

The culture of the Mountains was British, but with a Canadian strain. The Canadian landscape, Canadian material commodities, and Canadian outdoor sports all represented a native element. The Mountains had a great eye for Canadian scenery. In *Songs of the Wilderness* and in descriptions of his travels the Bishop frequently noted the beauty of the Canadian scene.⁶⁹ When Armine was in Scotland he was pleased that some of what he saw reminded him of the Canadian lakes.⁷⁰ Kate was quite disgusted with Bishop Fulford and his family when they came to Quebec in 1851 because they were indifferent to the scenery.⁷¹

The Mountains regarded themselves as Canadians. They had been longer in Canada than other observers of the Canadian scene like Mrs. Moodie and Mrs. Jameson who came to Canada in mature years. Bishop Mountain came to Canada at the age of four. His children were all born in North America. Jasper came to Nova Scotia at the age of eight. This second generation was closely identified with Canada. When Harriet accused Armine of forgetting Canada during his period of study in England, he denied this with vigour and asserted, "You ought to hear me making the Englishers angry with jealousy at my descriptions of my native land."⁷² Jacob expressed similar sentiments.⁷³ Jasper spoke with the authentic voice of Canada when he wrote to Harriet in 1873 complaining of the coldness of English houses.⁷⁴ Gustavus, Jasper's son, was even more consciously Canadian and critical of his English friends. He regarded it as high praise to say of a family with whom he visited, "Ceremony is a thing unheard of, and there is not the smallest trace of Englishness about a single one of them."⁷⁵

The Mountains were sure of themselves and of their philosophy. Anglicans and Tories, they took for granted their basic tenets of religion and politics. They were not introspective and, unlike some of the later Victorians, they were not forever examining their beliefs to see whether they still had any. Their firmness of conviction, essentially rooted in a pre-Darwinian form of Christian belief, gave rise to a great intellectual energy which worked itself out in the many aspects of their culture of which they were all proud. Mrs. Mountain wrote playfully but with a certain complacency to Harriet, "Now you see that I suit myself to my company when I talk about butter and cheese to you Townships folk. We are more *refined*, more elevated on Cape Diamond."⁷⁶

⁶⁹Bishop Mountain to Harriet, July 11, 1834, May 2, 1848; Bishop Mountain to Mrs. Mountain, Aug. 26, 1852.

⁷⁰Armine to Harriet, July 2, 1841. See also Armine to Harriet, Dec. 17, 1840.

⁷¹Kate to Harriet, June 7, 1851.

⁷²Armine to Harriet, Aug. 2, 1842.

⁷³Jacob to Harriet, Jan. 24, 1844.

⁷⁴Jasper to Harriet, Dec. 12, 1873.

⁷⁵Gustavus to Harriet, Dec. 13, 1869.

⁷⁶Mrs. Mountain to Harriet, Nov. 24, 1848.

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
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"Christian" Views of History: Toynbee and Butterfield

HILDA NEATBY, F.R.S.C.

IN one sense there is no Christian view of history any more than there is a Christian view of science or medicine. You don't ask whether a doctor is a Christian. Not only may his medicine be as good, but, broadly speaking, it will be exactly the same kind of medicine (if it is good) no matter what his creed. And so it is with the biologist, the chemist, the physicist. And so it must be with the historian.

The historian must insist that there is no Christian or pagan or Liberal or Conservative or Marxist or capitalist view of history which is not to a greater or less degree destructive of "good" history. The Marxist who is a good historian must distinguish (if he can) between his Marxist convictions and his historical evidences. And the Christian is in a similar position. If he is a Christian he will and must believe that all history centres in the life and death of a Galilean 2,000 years ago. But as an historian he will recognize that this is a matter of faith and not of reason. As an historian he is, indeed, deeply concerned with the activities of the followers of the Galilean. But as an historian he cannot assert the truth of the Christian creeds. His discipline recognizes the man Jesus; but only through faith can he call him Christ, the son of God.

All this is clear and understandable. And yet it is rather too simple. Can we separate the heart and soul from the strength and the mind in history or in anything else? Nobody much likes totalitarian states, but do we not all realize the truth of their position that you cannot divide politics from economics, or society from law, or education and culture from the state, or religion from anything?

And that is the problem of the historian. It is his job to extend and clarify the memory of the community by using such evidence as is available to him. But after he has gathered all his evidence he must still write his story. His is the task of the detective who with apparently fragmentary evidence before him must reconstruct the entire situation and try to say what really happened. And he cannot do this by simply piling brick on brick. He must have a pattern. He must select, arrange, interpret. And although he may insist that the pattern emerges solely from the evidence one cannot but believe that in any complex situation it also emerges from the man who looks at the evidence and who, as he tries to discern and describe human situations with a kind of divine objectivity, is himself a part of a special human situation, a prisoner of a special point in time and space. He must discipline his activities by what we call reason, but if he works with mind and strength alone,

forgetting about heart and soul, his history although free from the grosser faults will in a sense be inhuman and not history.

The historian then can never achieve the natural detachment of the man who surveys a colony of ants and whose observations on them may be sublimely free from the influences of time and space. It is probably safe to say that history seems most objective and rational in times when society is relatively calm and stable, when civilized men have achieved a general agreement about things that matter most to them, when agonizing human dilemmas are for the moment in abeyance. It is in times of revolution and change when the human predicament stirs all the forces of the heart and soul and strength and mind, that the historian finds a rational objectivity most difficult. Then he is likely to toss away old patterns that have worn down until they are almost imperceptible and write his history with his whole personality. Then he is very likely in his obsession with his own human situation to merge his role of objective recorder of the past with another one, that of the inspired prophet of the future. He is not inventing. It is simply that things never seen before have come clearly into focus revealing a new and wholly unsuspected set of relationships. The great creative historians are those who receive this new view of the past clearly and at the same time express it with, shall we say, reasonable honesty, without excessive arbitrary selection or distortion of facts. Complete honesty, like Utopia, is a thing one may rather wish than hope to see.

It is possible to distinguish many patterns of history writing in the Western world, each one corresponding more or less closely to the intellectual environment of the historian. Medieval chronicles recorded the dealings of God with men and their credulity sometimes—not always—matched their faith. But the modern historian developing his study as a purely rational investigation still needed and found a pattern: the dynastic, the rational-liberal, the nationalistic, the economic, the technological, or that strange blend of many, the Fascist.

It is the present century that has seen the historian return to the theme or pattern of religion in a fashion scarcely seen since the Middle Ages. The change may be due to a number of causes. Possibly the playing down of national loyalties has left an emotional and spiritual vacuum which must be filled. Again the utter breakdown in large and apparently civilized areas of everything that Westerners had associated with civilization and morality may have done something to revive that half-forgotten religious dogma of original sin. And the new religions of Communism and Nazism with their apparent repudiation of so many of the central values of Western civilization has perhaps done something to remind men that the Middle Ages was the formative period of our civilization and that the great centralizing and motivating force of that period seems to have been the Christian religion.

It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that some historians are dissatisfied with the explanation that the twentieth century represents a temporary madness, a momentary aberration in the course of rational evolution, and should ask themselves rather whether there may not be some force or pat-

tern working itself out in society which has been missed; whether, perhaps, it is not necessary to bear in mind not simply the fact of religious institutions and of private religious convictions, but also the fact of "religiousness" as an important—perhaps the important—fact of man's nature. If so, should not the course of history be reviewed for a possible pattern of religious determinism?

This is briefly what the most famous of modern historians has done. The striking thing about Toynbee's thirty years of labour is the way in which the passage of events and the temper of the time have imposed themselves on his work. He began to study history as the story of civilizations, their genesis, their breakdown, and their revival. He ended by producing what he calls a theodicy. History is "a vision—of God revealing Himself in action to souls that were sincerely seeking Him."¹ The change, remarked on by all who having read the earlier volumes (or the Somervell abridgement) have passed on to those published in the past few years, has grown out of Toynbee's reflections during the years of his study and writing. He has discerned in history a pattern apparently appropriate to the dilemma of his time. He is, says a reviewer, in danger of becoming the Billy Graham of the egg-heads.

Toynbee's many volumes, repudiating the "parochial" views of national historians, deal with the great civilizations. He has, however, offered his own interpretation of himself in the series of lectures entitled *A Historian Looks at Religion*. Here he gives his interpretation of history as emerging from the nature of man. Man is a creature who must be self-centred in order to live, but who in developing his autonomy falls into slavery because he multiplies unnatural demands on his environment. These are impossible to satisfy, and, resting unsatisfied, they destroy his peace and his freedom.

His only escape lies in the voluntary worship of something outside himself. Toynbee sees as central in all history the development of three forms of worship: the worship of nature, the worship of man, and the worship of God, or absolute reality "that is not either Nature or Man but is in them and at the same time beyond them."²

The worship of nature released man from the slavery of complete self-centredness, but it ceased to satisfy, inevitably, as soon as man's control over nature became reasonably effective. This worship yielded to one much more dangerous, the worship of man in the form of the collective power of community, the parochial state. The worship of man, unlike the worship of nature which can be peaceful, has been altogether bloody and brutal from the time when patriotic kings propitiated Moloch by making their sons pass through the fire to modern days when the national state chooses its fairest children as an offering to this insatiable god.

Much better, in Toynbee's view, than the parochial or national state, was the oecumenical state or empire which often succeeded it, and where, as in the Roman Empire, men exchanged parochial autonomy and suicidal

¹Toynbee, *Study of History*, vol. X (Oxford, 1954), p. 1.

²Toynbee, *A Historian Looks at Religion* (Oxford, 1956), p. 18.

warfare for subjection with peace and wise laws. But the oecumenical state was not a satisfactory object of worship, no one taking the customary emperor-worship very seriously.

It is in the dissolution of the oecumenical empire with its failure to provide spiritual satisfaction that Toynbee finds the favourable environment for the growth, generally among the humble and obscure, of what he calls the higher religions. He identifies these as Buddhism (the Mahayana sect), Hinduism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. He finds that these all have certain things in common: the search for God or absolute reality in but beyond both man and nature; the refusal to evade suffering and a willingness to accept and face it as an essential part of life and therefore necessary in any true life; the positive use of suffering in love and pity for one's fellow men. Such a religion in Toynbee's view can release man from the predicament which he has postulated. Suffering, the natural product of the tension in man between the desire for self-assertion and the fact of dependence, must be accepted as the essence of life; and it must be used in works of love and pity, in recognition of man's social nature. "He that loseth his life for *my sake* shall find it." "On the Christian-Mahayanian road the significance can be found in self-sacrifice for the sake of other living beings and for the love of a Supreme Being who is the centre of the Universe because he is love as well as Power."

The appearance of the higher religions, in Toynbee's view, showed man the true way of release from self-centredness, but the way was full of danger. Higher religions, for example, as institutions, made bargains with great states (the Christian church and the Roman Empire), thus sacrificing love and pity to power. They also succumbed to the temptation of dogma. To Toynbee religious truth is poetic truth. Translation into the theological terms of the creeds can only distort, and even kill it.

Worst of all, higher religions have succumbed to the most subtle danger for the individual or the institution, the danger of self-worship. All the great higher religions with their exclusive and mutually contradictory claims are guilty of this. It is here that the historian is ready and able to serve them. It is his task and his opportunity to enable men to break out of their self-centredness by revealing, through his natural curiosity about the past, all that he has learned of other people in other times and in other places. When a man has seen that other people have as much right as he to be self-centred he is ready to admit that he has as little right to be self-centred as they. "When a number of claimants standing at different points in Time and Space make the identical claim that each claimant's own particular point in Time-Space is the central one, common sense suggests that, if Time-Space does have any central point at all, this is not to be found in the local and temporary standpoint of any generation of any parochial human community."³

In the self-centredness of the higher religions Toynbee sees one important element in our modern predicament. The other element is the ascendancy

³*Ibid.*, p. 7.

of Western civilization with its old idols the nation state and the world state, and one new one, technology. Technology makes the world state not only possible but necessary if civilization is to continue at all. But the kind of world state that we shall get, if it is to meet our demands for security and a high standard of living, must greatly restrict our freedom with a variety of controls which old-fashioned people will find repulsive and alarming.

Freedom, however, may be found in the spiritual realm if we can overcome our self-centredness and our arrogance, if we can retain loyalty to what we know and believe without insisting that in all this vast universe ours is a unique revelation. "We can believe in our own religion without having to feel that it is the sole repository of truth. We can love it without having to feel that it is the sole means of salvation."⁴

And so Toynbee who sees self-centredness as the subtle and recurring sin and disaster of mankind finds in his pattern of history proof of the absurdity and iniquity of the sin, and at the same time of the possibility and urgency of overcoming it. He has indeed discerned a religious pattern in history; he believes that as an historian he has shown religion as capable of satisfying man's deepest and constant needs; but also of leading him to self-destruction if he cannot overcome his arrogant conviction that his is the only truth.

What can one say of this tremendous essay, supported as it is by the enormous historical work on which it is based? Obviously Toynbee is a great historian. Equally obviously he is much more than an historian. It may not be impertinent to suggest that by the very fact that he is much more than an historian he occasionally becomes rather less than one. I shall not attempt a detailed or exhaustive criticism, but shall mention only some rather obvious illustrations of this from the work on religion.

There is, first of all, Toynbee's claim that an historian is a peculiarly fit person to rebuke the higher religions in their claim to uniqueness and finality because his point of view is "the product of a conscious and deliberate endeavour to break out of the self-centredness that is innate in every living creature."⁵ But he has said himself that the foundation for an intellectual repudiation of man's self-centredness is a recognition on the part of every human being of the fact that every other human being has as much right as he has, and he has as little right as any other, to regard himself as the centre of the universe. Now as this is the foundation (as well as the culmination) of the historian's achievement one might well ask, was it an historian who first discovered this and did he do so by historical research? The answer, in each case, is in the negative. The revelation of the moral equality of man came, I suppose, to the Western world from those who come under Toynbee's severest strictures as having called themselves God's chosen people and prided themselves on His unique revelation of Himself to them, an odd and even ludicrous situation. The historian did not discover and he

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 298-9.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 135.

cannot prove; he can at best demonstrate the plausibility of the proposition that in the eyes of God or in the light of absolute reality all men's rights are equal.

Again Toynbee's whole thesis rests on his statement that in the essentials of higher religion, as he sees them, all the higher religions are in substantial agreement, differing only in their modes of thought and in their emphasis. He suggests, in fact, that their differences may perhaps be found to correspond to the differences between psychological types as classified by Jung. If this is so he foresees the possibility of a world of the future in which what are now profound religious differences will be resolved into matters of type and temperament, as, for example, the differences between Protestant sects or between Roman Catholic orders today.

This idea, it must be remembered, is offered by an historian to theologians as the fruit of his historical investigations. Its historical and philosophic validity must surely be tested in the first place by the establishment of analogies between the seven higher religions. It is, however, remarkable that in establishing these analogies Toynbee generally confines himself to noticing points of resemblance between the Christian religion and one, or at most two others, not always the same two. The one most frequently called on to make his case is the Mahayana sect of the Buddhists who advocate following not the theoretical teaching but the practical example of the Buddha who left his wealthy home and went about doing good. The core of Toynbee's eclectic religion he appears to find in Christianity and Mahayanism. Never does he attempt to demonstrate that all of his seven religions even approximate to the views on suffering, love, and pity that he expresses so eloquently. Even there Christians, at least, suffer rather from the eclectic strait jacket. Christians like Buddhists by their martyrdom showed "their voluntary acceptance of Suffering as an opportunity for active service."⁶ No Christian would have described his motives for martyrdom thus. He would have said rather that he died out of loyalty to a Person whom he loved and obeyed.

Moreover, Toynbee is quite dogmatic in his assertions about man's spiritual nature and about the "right road" to the truth. He has as much right as anyone to what he himself might call "poetic insights" into these matters, but as an historian he can do no more than establish facts, demonstrate analogies and (perhaps) give evidence of cause and effect. When he undertakes to say what is true and essential in religion he is not offering the insight of the historian in general, or of any historian as an historian, but only of Arnold Toynbee as a man.

Butterfield, while he welcomes the poet, the philosopher, the prophet, and the theologian as essential to "the fullness of our commentary on the drama of human life" does not want them to confuse themselves with the historians; still less does he want them, having made their pronouncements, to insist that "History says so." He closes one of his very early essays with a delightful passage in dispraise of history as an oracle: "History is all things

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 92.

to all men. She is at the service of good causes and bad. In other words, she is a harlot and a hireling, and for this reason she best serves those who suspect her most. Therefore, we must beware of saying 'History says . . .' or 'History proves . . .' as though she herself were the oracle; as though indeed history, once she has spoken, had put the matter beyond the range of mere inquiry. Rather we must say to ourselves: 'She will lie to us to the very end of the last cross-examination.'⁷

It is very well said, but Butterfield himself, as soon as he had recovered from the exhilaration of this performance, would warn us against the danger of being carried away by it. If we are not to stand in awe of history the divine oracle, neither must we allow ourselves the thrill of listening but of not really yielding to the harlot. The notion of consorting with her without yielding to her wiles is perhaps in itself dangerously seductive. In short, it might be better to try not to personify history at all.

This is, indeed, essentially Butterfield's position. He says much of the work and methods of the historian and of the materials with which he must work, but sets himself against saying History with a capital H. It is in this attitude that may be discerned what I take to be the first and fundamental divergence between Toynbee and Butterfield. Toynbee (as he says) is an historian looking at religion, and, as I have suggested, he assumes that as an historian he has some very special insights into religion. He assumes a discernible pattern in history, a clear, if difficult and tortuous progress of man in the search of God. Butterfield, on the other hand, sees himself as a Christian looking at history. He accepts the Christian outlook. He emphasizes the special interest that a Christian must have in history; it gives him an insight into the whole problem of human destiny, a destiny which, he believes, the Christian finds revealed in history rather than in nature. But coming to history as a Christian first (instead of approaching religion as an historian first) Butterfield is very firm on two things: as an historian it is not for him to make Christian judgments; and, as an historian it is not really his job to make judgments, to elicit general truths, or to demonstrate a pattern at all.

On the question of religious judgments he is very clear: "His [the historian's] training and habits of mind and all the methods of his research fasten him down to the particular and the concrete and make him essentially an observer of the events of the external world."⁸ And again, "His rôle is to describe; he stands impartial between the Christian and the Moham-medan; he is interested in neither one religion nor the other except as they are entangled in human lives."⁹ As an individual he may make judgments and indeed he must. "Our final interpretation of history is the most sovereign decision we can take, and it is clear that every one of us, as standing alone in the universe, has to take it for himself."¹⁰ But it must be equally clear that this is a total and personal decision. Neither history nor the historian can

⁷Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (London, 1950), pp. 131-2.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹⁰Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London, 1949).

whisper it in your ear. The historian "studies the changes of things which change and not the permanence of the mountains and the stars."¹¹

However, the very "scientific method," the rationalism which he insists on as the essential foundation of history, Butterfield identifies as a specifically Christian concept. At the beginning of the modern age, he says, scientists and historians alike sought to know more of the ways of God, but they discovered that by restricting oneself to the realm of secondary causes, one could pursue certain kinds of more mundane inquiry to better purpose.¹² Moreover, students of different faiths could co-operate better if they agreed not to settle—this they could not do—but to shelve ultimate questions as they addressed themselves to their secondary task. "It is the Marxists and the secularist systematisers who, without reaching as high as God . . . commit their minds to vast intermediate systems of ideas. . . . The believer in Providence can be prepared for any surprises. The Christian need put no limits to the Creator's versatility."¹³

And so Butterfield the Christian opposes "Christian" and all other rigid historical interpretations by historians as such. He thinks them false, and in the shape of what he scornfully calls "abridgements," exceedingly harmful.

Butterfield would, of course, hardly call Toynbee's life work an "abridgement." When he speaks of Toynbee he does so slightly but always with courtesy and deference. There is no doubt, however, that he differs profoundly from Toynbee, whose pattern is essentially an adaptation of Spengler's application of Darwinism to history. Toynbee's view sees man stumbling out of his own self-centredness and away from a variety of false gods through many sins and errors, but in the long run moving into the light. The present he sees as a time of great peril and suffering but of unexampled opportunity, a culmination long prepared.

Such a view Butterfield rejects categorically. To think of every past age (as Toynbee tends to do) as serving purposefully and even gratifyingly to produce the admirable present is, Butterfield believes, to indulge in unchristian arrogance wholly unjustified by historical fact. The technique of historical study itself demands that we shall look upon each generation as, so to speak, "an end in itself, a world of people existing in their own right. . . ." "Every generation is equidistant from eternity." "If we want an analogy with history, we must think of something like a Beethoven symphony—the point of it is not saved up until the end, the whole of it is not a mere preparation for a beauty that is only to be achieved in the last bar." "And neither do I know of any mundane fullness of life which we could pretend to possess and which was not open to people in the age of Isaiah or Plato, Dante or Shakespeare."¹⁴

One could ask for no more stern or even startling rejection of evolution

¹¹*The Whig Interpretation of History*.

¹²Butterfield, *History and Human Relations* (London, 1951), p. 137.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 141.

¹⁴*Christianity and History*, pp. 65, 66, 67.

or even of progress in history. Butterfield's contention is that such a view is more in harmony with the known and established facts than is any evolutionary theory. He would also concede that in its insistence on the impossibility of complacently regarding countless generations of men as means contributing to the glorious end of the present it is a characteristically Christian view.

His insistence on this point, "that the generations of the past are not to be dismissed as subordinate to the later ones, mere stepping stones to the present day, mere preparations or trial shots for an authentic achievement . . . still to come . . . mere means to an end that lies above personalities"¹⁵ reveals another sharp difference between his approach to history and Toynbee's. Toynbee takes civilizations as his "proper area of historical study." He finds them to be the nurseries of oecumenical states which in their turn harbour universal churches. These great organizations Toynbee finds better, even because of their greatness, than the small states, in that they seem to be removed a step farther from the curse of self-centredness.

Butterfield, in sharp contrast, finds the proper area for historical study simply in men. He says, in effect, "All that we can really know is that men did such and such a thing at such and such a time. And because we too are men we can wonder why." The essential task of the historian, he believes, apart from collecting and fitting his bits of evidence, is to get into other men's skins in order to understand why they did what they did. His function, and this he emphasizes, as an historian, and as a Christian, is to understand, not to judge. To judge is at once unchristian and unhistorical. "Instead of seeing the modern world emerge as the victory of the children of light over the children of darkness in any generation, it is at least better to see it emerge as the result of a clash of wills, a result which often neither party wanted nor even dreamed of. . . ."¹⁶

It must be emphasized that this last quotation brings Toynbee and Butterfield near together. Each is impressed with the universality of human sin, and the profound need for humility. But whereas Toynbee moves chiefly among institutions which he feels quite competent to classify and judge, Butterfield begins and ends with men. And doing so, as a Christian, inevitably rejecting the intermediate systems, he finds the ultimate unity of history in the majesty and the goodness of God. "We envisage our history in the proper light, therefore, if we say that each generation—indeed each individual—exists for the glory of God; but one of the most dangerous things in life is to subordinate human personality to production, to the state, even to civilization itself, to anything but the glory of God."¹⁷

This is, of course, Butterfield the Christian speaking. He would argue, though, that such an interpretation is not inconsistent with scientific historical truth, and, in his view, rather less out of harmony with the discernible

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁶*The Whig Interpretation of History*, p. 28.

¹⁷*Christianity and History*, p. 67.

facts than any evolutionary system which loses sight of the individual. And from this premise emerges the theology of history which Butterfield allows as a Christian (but would never assert as an historian). He sees the only satisfactory moral pattern in history in the typically, if not exclusively Christian teachings of the possibility of purification of the individual by suffering and the possible efficacy of vicarious suffering with its supreme example in the central fact of history as interpreted by Christians, the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. He asserts vigorously, for example, that the horrors associated with the fall of the Roman Empire cannot be washed out for him by the complacent reflection that they all played a part in the growth of Western Europe. There must be some deeper reconciliation, if one is to assert a moral order in the universe at all.

He also, while rejecting the more facile "judgments" of history, suggests tentatively that one form of judgment does seem to be consistently operative, the form that was unceasingly stressed by the Hebrew prophets.

Judgment in history [he says] falls heaviest on those who come to think themselves gods, who fly in the face of Providence and history, who put their trust in man-made systems and worship the work of their own hands, and who say that the strength of their own right arm gave them the . . . victory. . . . such a man by aping providence blasphemes God, and brings more rapid tragedy on the world and on himself than the people who give half their lives to wine, women and song. And similarly, if men put their faith in science and make it the be-all and end-all of life as though it were not to be subdued to any higher ethical end, there is something in the very composition of the universe that will make it execute judgment on itself, if only in the shape of the atom bomb.¹⁸

In this passage Butterfield has certainly moved over entirely to prophecy and theology. He would admit it. Toynbee would be in complete agreement with him here. The difference between the two, and I think that it is a fundamental one, is that Toynbee assumes that his history is instructing his prophecy; Butterfield knows that his theology is illuminating his history.

It is tempting in conclusion to venture on speculative parallels between these two men. One can almost see Toynbee's history as a solemn dedication of man in society to a prolonged but clear and progressive programme of works which, inspired and strengthened by faith, may in the end secure his salvation. Butterfield sees him cast in the sea of history, exposed to the certain results of his own sin, and yet still within the grace and Providence of God, these as certain as the sin, but mysterious and unpredictable in their operation. Man at any time in history, in Butterfield's view, must hope and strive, but he may not judge, nor may he seek to blueprint the workings of the divine will. If they must be labelled I would suggest that Toynbee was a Platonist and Butterfield something of a Calvinist, but I must say that with all the humility so highly recommended by both these historians.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 60.



The Roman Army and the Disintegration of the Roman Empire

E. T. SALMON, F.R.S.C.

THE popular view that the Roman Empire disappeared owing to a marked change for the worse in the character of the Romans has never found much favour among historians; and it surely must be the case that so *simple* a theory cannot possibly be the only explanation. Nevertheless one might well ask whether a change for the worse in a specific part of its population may not have contributed more than a little to the Empire's ultimate disintegration. This is a matter well worth examining, in so far as it concerns the Roman imperial army. In its heyday throughout the first and second centuries A.D. that army was manifestly a magnificent instrument of power.¹ It met all the basic requirements for a first-class fighting force: an organization careful to the point of elaboration, a singularly efficient system of administration, and a standard of training that enabled it to be victorious in the field. Yet gradually the personnel composing this incomparable force ceased to be respectable elements of the Empire's population. As time went on the army became so barbarized that, by the fifth century and even earlier, the defence of the Empire was quite literally in the hands of Germans; this progressive and accelerating barbarization has long been recognized as an important factor in the so-called "decline and fall." This paper addresses itself to the problem which would appear to be fundamental: the reason for, and the progress of, the barbarization. It is pertinent to ask why the Roman state had recourse to alien defenders; to stress how early this process began; and, above all, to emphasize how Caracalla's enfranchising act, the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, contributed to it.

Over thirty years ago Rostovtzeff insisted that it was really the action of the peasants in making common cause with an undisciplined soldiery to assault the urban bourgeoisie which caused the break-up of the Roman Empire.² This view was clearly coloured by its author's own experiences under the Bolsheviks in his native Russia; today nobody accepts without drastic qualification his picture of a Jacquerie uprising combined with military revolt.³ It is, in fact, possible to prove that the theory of peasants and

¹All dates, unless otherwise indicated, are dates A.D.

²M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926). Despite criticism in the intervening years the views expressed in the famous twelfth chapter reappeared unchanged in the Italian edition of 1946. A new English edition of this great work has appeared (Oxford, 1957), since this paper was written, but it contains no modifications worth mentioning.

³See, e.g., H. Last's review of Rostovtzeff in *Journ. Rom. Stud.*, 16 (1926), pp. 120-8.

soldiery working in a kind of unholy alliance for the extermination of the urban bourgeoisie is very wide of the mark indeed. In the first place, the forces of the Empire, even the Late Empire, were not merely a peasant militia;⁴ in the second place, the peasantry suffered just as severely at the hands of the disorderly soldiers as did the city-dwellers.⁵ Yet the Russian scholar had done well to emphasize one fact, that in the Roman Empire there was a lack of solidarity between soldiers and civilians.

At least, such was the fact in the chaotic and anarchic third century. But was it equally a fact in the preceding two centuries? When did the rot, so to speak, set in? What caused it?

Tacitus described the scene of Vitellius' legions battling Vespasian's in Rome itself, while "the populace stood by watching the combatants as if at a gladiatorial show, urging on first one side and then the other with their shouts and applause."⁶ From this one is tempted to assume that the split had occurred as early as 69 and that the Roman state was already displaying that fissure which was to put its civilians on one side and its soldiers on another, until ultimately the two elements in the state were completely at loggerheads, if not at daggers drawn. Tacitus himself almost seems to imply as much when he insists that this same unhappy year, 69, revealed the momentous secret of the Empire: that an emperor could be created elsewhere than at Rome.⁷ Yet too much ought not to be read into the rhetorical *mot* of the writer who is notoriously the most cynical of all Rome's historians. Nor, possibly, can the behaviour of Rome's civilians be taken as typical. Civilians outside Italy may not have had this attitude of detached indifference to the struggles and aspirations of the soldiers in 69. Troops other than Praetorians simply had no business to be in Rome at all in 69, much less to be converting it into a battleground. Soldiers were stationed in the provinces and should stay where they belonged. Their presence in Rome was contrary to all tradition and practice and as such constituted an offence against its citizens. Under the circumstances one can understand any civilian in Italy, and above all in Rome, adopting an attitude of "a plague on both your houses." Elsewhere in the Empire it may well have been a very different story.

Nor is this all. Except in the year 69—a quite abnormal year which has been given far too much importance—the soldiers were generally well behaved in the first two centuries. Not until 193 did the legions again rend the Empire asunder with civil war, even though between 69 and 193 there had been occasions when they had had convenient pretexts for doing so.⁸ The year 69 is the exception that proves the rule,⁹ and even in 69 order was

⁴E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (Kendal, 1953), p. 86.

⁵N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (London, 1953), pp. 93, 307–9.

⁶Tacitus, *Histories*, 3. 83.

⁷*Ibid.*, 1. 4.

⁸For example, the death of Domitian (96) or that of Trajan (117) had surely presented opportunities which the soldiers might have been expected to exploit.

⁹The troubles in 69 were chiefly due to the fact that the inhabitants of the Empire, soldiers and civilians alike, were genuinely bewildered and uncertain as to where their

finally re-established, and, once re-established, it remained so for a century and a quarter. Throughout practically the whole of the first two centuries the outlook of the soldiers was not radically different from that of the civilians, a circumstance which is hardly surprising in view of the origins of the legionaries.

The provenance of the Roman soldiers is not altogether unknown despite the almost total failure of the literary sources to refer to it.¹⁰ Authors like Tacitus say very little on the topic, presumably because they could safely assume that their readers would know where the soldiers were mostly recruited.¹¹ Fortunately, inscriptions have helped to make good the omission.¹² The evidence, regrettably not always datable,¹³ consists of such things as soldiers' tombstones, honorific plaques, the few, rare, precious lists of personnel serving in various formations,¹⁴ and the so-called "centurial stones" which help to identify some units and the men serving in them.¹⁵ From the inscriptions it is often possible to tell whether a soldier was an Italian or a provincial either from his birthplace, if that is indicated,¹⁶ or, if it is not, from the citizen tribe in which he (if a legionary) was enrolled,¹⁷ or from the place where the inscription was found. It can be demonstrated that the standing army of the Roman Empire, from the days of Augustus (its

duty lay. Nero's suicide (June, 68) had brought the Julio-Claudian dynasty to an end; there was no adult male Julian or Claudian who, in accordance with the precedent set in 41, could automatically be considered as the logical successor. In that case, where did men's allegiance belong? It is not surprising that in such circumstances each of the rival pretenders to the purple should have been able to win a certain amount of support.

¹⁰The evidence is discussed by Birley, amongst others, in *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*.

¹¹There was, however, a technical literature on the Roman army (Herodian 2. 15. 6); unfortunately it has not survived.

¹²Not only inscriptions on stone: papyri from Egypt and more recently from Syria have furnished valuable information.

¹³For criteria for dating inscriptions, see H. Thylander, *Etude sur l'épigraphie latine* (Lund, 1952), *passim*; K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau* (Berne, 1951), p. 18.

¹⁴E.g., *C.I.L.* 3. 6580 (partly reproduced in *I.L.S.* 2304), a list of the centurions of Legio III Augusta at Lambaesis in 162; *C.I.L.* 3. 18065 (partly reproduced in *I.L.S.* 2452), a list of centurions of Legio II Traiana at Alexandria in 194; *C.I.L.* 16, App. no. 13, a list of centurions of Legio X Fretensis in Palestine in 150.

¹⁵These are inscribed stones set up to show the work carried out by a century; the century was often called after the centurion (the *pilus prior*) who happened to be commanding it at the time.

¹⁶Gradually the custom of recording the man's birthplace was dropped.

¹⁷For instance, a soldier belonging to the tribe Pollia had very probably been born *castris*, his father having also been a soldier before him. Likewise the emperors, when they enfranchised men who did not have *municipalis origo*, showed a tendency to enrol them in a specific tribe: Augustus (following Julius' example) used the tribe Fabia for this purpose; Tiberius and Gaius did the same; Claudius, Nero, and the Flavians preferred the tribe Quirina; Nerva and Trajan used the tribe Papiria, Hadrian the Sergia. After Hadrian a man's tribe gradually ceases to be indicated; it disappears entirely under Caracalla.

founder) onwards, included many non-Italians. These were by no means confined to the *auxilia*: they, amounting to about half the armed establishment in Augustus' day,¹⁸ were provincial almost to a man; even their officers, although they possessed the Roman citizenship, were often non-Italian.¹⁹ Non-Italians were also present in the legions in large numbers. Today this is a fact familiar to all students of the Empire; but perhaps not everyone realizes that the number of non-Italians was quite certainly very much larger than can be positively proved. For, though many an inscription lists not a soldier's place of origin, but merely his good Italian name, this is no guarantee that he was in fact an Italian: it might merely mean that he was an enfranchised provincial, since it was usual for a provincial to assume an Italian name when he received the Roman citizenship.²⁰

The view that the provincialization of the legions did not really begin until Vespasian is no longer tenable.²¹ Already in the earliest days of the Empire the process had developed considerably.²² This may well seem surprising, since it is well known that legionaries, unlike auxiliaries, had to be Roman citizens, and in Augustus' day Roman citizens were still comparatively rare in the provinces. Yet the number of legionaries from the provinces in the first half of the first century was anything but small; in the second half of the same century they were an overwhelming majority; and by the early years of the second century the provincialization of the legions was well-nigh complete.²³ It is clear that the comparatively few Roman citizens in the provinces in Julio-Claudian times could not possibly have supplied all the personnel who were serving in the legions. The conclusion, then, is inescap-

¹⁸Tacitus, *Annals* 4. 5 implies this, and as no fewer than fourteen cavalry *alae* and seventy infantry *cohortes* served in the Pannonian War (6-9) (Vell. Pat. 2. 113) the *auxilia* must have been quite numerous (and they tended to become even more numerous with the gradual disappearance of "client" kings). It does not follow, of course, that the proportion of auxiliaries to legionaries was always and everywhere the same.

¹⁹To mention some notorious examples: Arminius, Civilis, and Vindex.

²⁰Indications sometimes exist to show that the bearer of a good Roman or Italian name was in fact a provincial: see Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, pp. 154-71. A man's *praenomen*, or the lack of it, can be revealing; non-Italians, especially non-Italians enfranchised by an emperor, attached little importance to it.

²¹Suggested but not unequivocally asserted by Mommsen, "Die Conscriptionsordnung der römischen Kaiserzeit" in *Gesammelte Schriften* 6 (1910), p. 36 ff.

²²There is literary as well as epigraphic evidence for it: e.g. Tacitus, *Annals* 13. 7; 13. 35; 16. 13.

²³Cf. P. Fraccaro on the situation at the end of the first century: "L'esercito romano è formato tutto di provinciali e anche di barbari provenienti da oltre i confini" (*Livio e Roma*, Pavia, 1942, p. 24). Certainly documents such as *C.I.L.* 8. 18084 and 18085 indicate that under Hadrian (117-38) legionary recruits were almost invariably provincials. This, however, is not to say that it was Hadrian who was responsible for the provincialization of the army. Still more untenable is the view of A. von Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres* (Bonn, 1908), p. 133, that Septimius Severus (193-211) was responsible for the de-Italianization of the Roman imperial army (H. Dessau, "Die Herkunft der Offiziere und Beamten des römischen Kaiserreiches" in *Hermes* 45 (1910), p. 1 ff.).

able: the provincial legionaries, in many cases, must have been given the Roman citizenship in order to qualify them for service.²⁴

If it is true that from the earliest days of the Empire legionaries and auxiliaries alike were recruited from the provinces, one might wonder why certain sons of the provinces were enfranchised and enrolled in the legions, whereas others were not and were assigned to the *auxilia*. Theoretically the recruit's place of origin decided the matter. If he came from a town that was formally organized along municipal lines (in other words, if he possessed *municipalis origo*), he became a legionary; if he came from a country district, then he was required to serve as an auxiliary.²⁵ In inscriptions, especially those of the first century which are the most likely to indicate a soldier's birthplace, only legionaries appear with *municipalis origo*: an auxiliary is described as hailing from a tribe (*natio*). The reason for this rule was the official conviction that civilization in its best and most veritable form was to be found only in an urban community.²⁶ Someone from a town could safely be presumed to be ready for Roman citizenship: his assimilation would present no serious difficulties; his outlook could be assumed to be already very similar to that of a native Italian; and consequently he would quickly become imbued with the Roman spirit. The country-dweller, on the other hand, was still in Roman eyes far from civilized; he would not be ready for the citizenship until twenty-five years of service as an auxiliary in the Roman armed forces had familiarized him with Roman ways and the Roman outlook.²⁷ Thus Greece, completely urbanized and *ex hypothesi* civilized, supplied no *auxilia*, although individuals with Greek names do appear in auxiliary units.²⁸ Similarly Gallia Narbonensis, a highly urbanized province, provided few auxiliaries, but numerous legionaries. Exactly the reverse was true of the other Gallic provinces, the imperial Tres Galliae:²⁹ these contained few towns or cities, and in the first two centuries they were in fact the chief recruiting ground for the auxiliary cavalry.³⁰

²⁴G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano* (Milan and Rome, 1953), pp. 51–84, shows how high a proportion of the legionaries were provincials, but his view (p. 115) that more than half of them were citizens by birth does not seem to me convincing, and even if it were true it would still leave enough to substantiate the assertion of Aelius Aristides (*The Roman Oration*, 74, 75, Oliver) that Rome obtained personnel for the legions by giving citizenship to provincials.

²⁵See Mommsen, "Die Conscriptionsordnung der römischen Kaiserzeit," *passim*.

²⁶There was also, at first, a practical reason. Legionaries were supposed to be recruited from Roman citizens and early in the first century the only places where Roman citizens were likely to be found in the provinces were the corporate towns, such as the *coloniae* and *municipia*.

²⁷Auxiliaries regularly obtained the Roman citizenship on their release from the service, at least from the time of Claudius (41–54) on.

²⁸A man's Greek cognomen is, however, no proof that he was a Greek or even Greek-speaking. It was customary to give slaves of whatever origin Greek names, which they retained as *cognomina* on their manumission.

²⁹Raetia similarly supplied a large number of *auxilia*.

³⁰In the first century Spain also was an important supplier of auxiliary cavalry; in the second century Thrace increasingly provided the personnel.

Theory and practice, however, may not always have coincided. What happened, for instance, when not enough men with *municipalis origo* were offering themselves?³¹ For it should be remembered that the Roman imperial army was for the most part an army of volunteers. The Roman state, under the Empire as under the Republic, did have the right to conscribe its subjects, citizens or others, for military service. But apparently conscription was not normal under the Empire except in emergencies (cf. *Digest* 49. 16. 4. 10, referring to Trajan's day: *plerumque voluntario milite numeri supplentur*). In the case of citizens (i.e., potential legionary recruits) conscription seems to have disappeared by Tiberius' reign (14-37); in the case of non-citizens (i.e., potential auxiliary recruits) it continued to be used occasionally. Provincial communities might be allotted quotas and, to fill them, resort to forced levies was sometimes necessary: in such cases the men resented having to serve, especially in areas far from home (Tacitus, *Annals*, 4. 46). On other occasions communities were induced to supply soldiers by tax concessions (Tacitus, *Histories*, 4. 12; *Germ.*, 29). In general, the Roman government would prefer to employ the carrot rather than the stick, since the *auxilia* would be obtained from the martial peoples whom it was dangerous to irritate beyond endurance by excessive resort to press-gang methods. Other reasons why volunteers should have been preferred readily suggest themselves. The Roman imperial army was a long-service, as well as a standing, force. During the first three centuries twenty-five years was the normal period of service for most soldiers, and clearly it would have been inequitable to use selective conscription to get them. An obvious alternative would have been what used to be called the Continental System (a system of universal conscription and short-term soldiers) and, if Cassius Dio (52. 27) is to be believed, this idea did occur, or was suggested, to Augustus at the time that he was organizing the standing army of the Empire; he deliberately rejected it, Dio implies, on the ground that universal conscription and military training would have been a constant source of public disorder and civil wars. This aspect of the matter may have carried some weight with the canny Augustus. But besides this prudential objection to an army of short-term conscripts, there was another and eminently practical one. The frontiers of the Empire were so far flung that short-service conscripts could scarcely have provided an adequate defence for them. In the days before railways the conscripts would have spent most of their short service careers, not in serious training, but in travelling either to or from their postings; their combat efficiency would not have been very high. The American Civil War proved that in a land of vast distances, even one with railways,

³¹In the Greek-speaking east this was already the case in the first century; many of the legionary recruits there were obtained from the notoriously unurbanized provinces of Galatia and Cappadocia (Tacitus, *Annals* 13. 35. 4). As H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), p. 172, puts it: "Obstacles presented by recruits who were not citizens and who could point to no Roman town as their birthplace were easily surmounted."

short-term troops are not of much use. Accordingly, Augustus and, following his lead, the later emperors decided on an army of long-service troops, usually volunteers.

It is usually argued that there was no particular difficulty in attracting recruits since the numbers involved were small.³² Legionaries and auxiliaries together amounted to about 300,000 in Augustus' day and could be kept up to strength with an annual intake of 30,000 or less.³³ Is it correct, however, to regard such figures as moderate? An army of 300,000 may seem small by the standards which were set when the Committee of Public Safety of revolutionary France proclaimed universal conscription in 1793, but by the standards of the ancients it was prodigious. The Hellenistic monarchies, the Roman Republic, the state of Parthia would all have regarded such a force as formidable if not staggering.³⁴

In view of the conditions of service difficulties in recruitment would hardly be surprising. The serving soldier had a rough time.³⁵ The pay for a man in the legions in the first two centuries was low, less than a *denarius* a day;³⁶ and his "take home" pay was lower still, for apparently he had to pay for his personal weapons, his clothing, his rations, and even his tent.³⁷ The man in the *auxilia* must have been even worse off, the best proof being that an inter-service transfer (*militiae mutatio*), from legions to *auxilia*, was the prescribed punishment for certain military offences.³⁸ Moreover, discipline was harsh; even in the legions corporal punishment, arbitrarily inflicted, was normal, and fatigue duties were so onerous that the soldier spent a good deal of his meagre pay bribing his way out of them. True, he came in for the occasional windfall in the shape of a donative³⁹ or a share in war-booty,⁴⁰ although what Pliny calls the *immensa maiestas pacis Romanae*⁴¹ meant that he could not hope for very much of the latter; and of course on discharge he was entitled to a gratuity, which, however, sometimes failed to materialize⁴² and in any case could hardly be described as princely.⁴³ Nor was there much

³²E.g. by W. Liebenam in *R. E.*, 5 (1905) s.v. "Dilectus," 616.

³³For intake requirements, see Mommsen, "Die Conscriptionsordnung der römischen Kaiserzeit," p. 22; his estimate is that the total annual requirement would not have exceeded 20,000.

³⁴Cf. T. Frank, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 1 (Baltimore, 1933), p. 222.

³⁵On the rights of a Roman soldier see now E. Sander, "Das Recht des römischen Soldaten" in *Rhein. Mus.*, 100 (1958), pp. 152-91.

³⁶On the soldiers' pay, see P. A. Brunt, "Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army" in *Pap. Brit. Sch. at Rome* 18 (=N.S. 5) (1950), pp. 50-71; G. R. Watson, "The Pay of the Roman Army" in *Historia* 5 (1956), pp. 332-40.

³⁷Brunt, "Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army," p. 53; A. C. Johnson, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 2 (Baltimore, 1936), p. 670.

³⁸*Digest* 49. 16.

³⁹If he were a legionary; the *auxilia* apparently were not entitled to *donativa*.

⁴⁰The prospect of loot had long been one of the things to entice men into the army: see Livy 42. 32. 6 (writing of the second century B.C.).

⁴¹Pliny, *N.H.*, 27. 1. 3.

⁴²G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano*, p. 37.

⁴³T. Frank, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 5 (Baltimore, 1940), p. 170.

glamorous excitement to compensate for the tough service conditions. Service life was passed in a frontier province far from the amusements and the amenities of a city like Rome,⁴⁴ and when, early in the second century, Hadrian abandoned Trajan's dynamic policy the soldier's life was only too likely to consist of little more than boring and morale-shattering guard duty in an immobile unit.⁴⁵ Legally he could not even marry: prior to the third century his partner, if any, had the legal status of a concubine and his children, if any, were legally SP (*sine patre*).⁴⁶

Manifestly there was not much to attract volunteers, and indeed it was no simple matter to keep the numbers of such a redoubtable force up to strength from the ranks of Roman citizens only. In the first century the numbers could sometimes only be maintained by obliging veterans whose time had expired to continue with the colours.⁴⁷ The astonishing thing is that nevertheless such volunteers as were forthcoming in the first two centuries included quite a large proportion of the Empire's better classes.⁴⁸ Inscriptions prove that many of the provincial legionaries came from good, middle-class families and were men of excellent education and superior intelligence. Many of them were good officer material and rose from the ranks to become centurions,⁴⁹ and it may have been the prospect of such promotion that caused

⁴⁴A centurion who became *primus pilus* stood a good chance of becoming an officer in the Praetorian Guards at Rome, but by then he would be well advanced in years as well as in rank. After Domitian's day a few picked auxiliary cavalrymen also managed to get to Rome, by being selected for service in the *equites singulares*.

⁴⁵"During the following 120 years hardly a legion changed its position and the auxiliary regiments remained almost equally stationary." G. L. Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army* (Oxford, 1914), p. 114.

⁴⁶R. Bloch, *L'épigraphie romaine* (Paris, 1952), p. 31. Soldiers' "common-law" marriages were, it is true, recognized officially from the reign of Domitian (81-96), but they were not legal. Septimius Severus first permitted soldiers to contract a legal marriage while still on active service (Herodian 3. 8. 5), but even under him there were no married quarters inside the camp walls and the married soldiers were not allowed to remain permanently outside.

⁴⁷It was this practice that caused the mutiny at Tiberius' accession (Tacitus, *Annals*, 1. 17); after the first century, it must be admitted, it is rare to find men serving beyond their term of enlistment.

⁴⁸The evidence is adduced by G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano, passim*. One would have expected something of the sort, of course, in the case of "direct-entry" officers (i.e., the equestrians for whom Claudius organized the system of *tres militiae*, whereby a man served successively as *praefectus cohortis*, *tribunus militum*, and *praefectus alae*). But the reference in the text above is to "other ranks."

⁴⁹The centurion occupied a coveted and responsible post; in the days before Claudius organized the *tres militiae* he might actually have his own independent command (of an auxiliary cohort or, if he were *primus pilus*, even of an auxiliary *ala*). The overwhelming majority of the centurions were not ex-praetorians, as used to be believed, but worked their way up from the ranks; nor was the centurionate specifically reserved for Italians, as Dessau, "Die Herkunft der Offiziere und Beamten des römischen Kaiserreiches," p. 1 ff., following Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*, pp. 83-90, believed. Italians predominated at first owing to the fact that their citizenship was likely to be of long standing; that of provincials in the first century was almost inevitably recent. The

some of them to enlist; but since it was normally reserved for those provincials whose Roman citizenship was of fairly long standing⁵⁰ (and there were few of these), it is safe to assume that it was not the prospect of becoming officers that attracted many of the better class provincial recruits into the army.

The prospect of Roman citizenship was the big inducement.⁵¹ Roman citizenship improved the social standing, but above all the civil status, of the recipient; it opened far more opportunities for him and his family. All provincials were eager to acquire it, and there was virtually only one avenue to it: service in the Roman imperial army.⁵² If provincials served in the legions they obtained the citizenship the moment they enlisted; if they served in the *auxilia* they obtained it twenty-five years later on their release from service.⁵³ It was this desire of the provincials to acquire Roman citizenship that accounts for the fact that during the first two centuries voluntary enlistments sufficed to keep the armed services up to establishment.

Certainly the army would not have remained at full strength if it had depended on volunteers from those who already possessed the Roman citizenship. For these showed a most remarkable disinclination to serve. The rigours of service life no doubt help to account for the Roman citizen's aversion; but there was probably another reason as well. Examples of countries where the service conditions are hardly any better than in the Roman Empire but which nevertheless have had comparatively little difficulty in inducing men to join up can be adduced. Patriotism is the spur. If patriotism did not similarly inspire "the man in the Roman street," to use Mattingly's phrase, it must have been largely because the régime of the Caesars was an authoritarian régime, a benevolently paternalist one at times perhaps, but authoritarian for all that, one in which the man in the street was not only not encouraged to participate in public life but was positively dissuaded from doing so. He had no share in affairs of state, which were exclusively the domain of his betters. He naturally had no voice in any decision, since it was the *sapientissimus et unus*, the emperor, who decided everything. The average citizen was not even regularly and systematically informed about public affairs and imperial policies, for in the Roman Empire there was no system of universal state education nor even a popular press. All that the average citizen really knew was that he belonged to an Empire that was

proportion of non-Italian centurions rises significantly in the second century: see Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, pp. 102-4. There is even evidence for provincials who were "direct-entry" centurions in the *auxilia*: J. F. Gilliam, "The Appointment of Auxiliary Centurions (*PMich.* 164)" in *Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc.*, 88 (1957), pp. 155-68.

⁵⁰In other words T. Flavii will be officers under Trajan, not under the Flavians.

⁵¹This has recently been well expressed by E. Pulgram, *The Tongues of Italy* (Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 301: "Roman citizenship was put up for sale as part of the soldiers' wages."

⁵²Even Claudius was reluctant to grant it for any other reason.

⁵³For the status of the auxiliary's offspring, see p. 54.

certainly mighty and apparently invincible and that he was expected to leave its administration to others. Is it any wonder that the fires of patriotism burned low? The average citizen could hardly be blamed for assuming that the Empire had no desperate need of him. His services were obviously not desired for helping to run the Empire, and in view of its seeming impregnability they did not appear to be very much needed for helping to defend it either. As Mommsen pointed out many years ago, Augustus' achievement in re-establishing law and order and providing the world with peace and a *princeps* relieved the average Roman citizen of any responsibility in that regard. The average Roman citizen forthwith concluded that he was entitled to escape military service. Exemption from military service, in fact, came to be regarded as one of the privileges to which the *ingenuus*, the Roman citizen born, was entitled.

In Italy, where of course virtually all who were not slaves were citizens, recruits were notoriously hard to find.⁵⁴ When, at the time of the Pannonian Revolt and the Teutoburg Disaster, Augustus suddenly and urgently needed men, he found himself obliged to enlist freedmen and even slaves in the legions.⁵⁵ His successor, Tiberius, deplored the Italian aversion for military service but could not correct it.⁵⁶ Shortly after the middle of the first century legions could be described as *militem peregrinum et externum*,⁵⁷ and by 100 they could be referred to as the *militia provincialis*.⁵⁸ By 100, then, serious attempts to recruit legionaries in Italy had been abandoned,⁵⁹ and, even though there were still perhaps some Italians serving in the legions in the second century,⁶⁰ most of them who had any hankering for the military life were much more likely to be found in the Praetorian Guards.⁶¹

Roman citizens in the provinces, especially in the armed, imperial provinces, may have come forward in somewhat larger numbers than did Roman citizens in Italy. It was often a case of a son following his father's profession. A soldier who passed his service life in a frontier province often settled down there on his discharge. If he settled near the frontier instead of deep inside the province, there might well be very few avenues to employment, apart from

⁵⁴Italian unwillingness to serve was nothing new: see Livy 43. 14. 2 (referring to the second century B.C.).

⁵⁵Tacitus, *Annals*, 1. 31 (*vernacula multitudo*); Cassius Dio 56. 23. 3.

⁵⁶Tacitus, *Annals*, 4. 4.

⁵⁷Tacitus, *Histories*, 2. 21.

⁵⁸Hyginus Gromaticus, *de mun. castrorum*, 2.

⁵⁹The Transpadane district seems to have continued supplying recruits longer than any other district of Italy: cf. Dessau, *I.L.S.* 1068, 1098. Whatever the explanation for the fact that Marcus Aurelius (161-80) enrolled two new legions each with the cognomen Italica, it cannot be taken to mean that in the late second century it was easy to find recruits in Italy.

⁶⁰H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), p. 180 ff.

⁶¹The Praetorians had incomparably more attractive terms of service (legionaries and auxiliaries indeed despised them as soft and effeminate) and under Augustus' arrangements were supposed to be chiefly composed of Italians; even under Augustus, however, Gauls and Germans were serving in the Praetorians, according to Dio 56. 23. 4.

the army, for his son, whose lifetime familiarity with the army might give him some advantage over other recruits. It is significant that numerous inscriptions, many of them later than 100, record soldiers as having been born *castris*;⁶² that is, in the settlement (*canabae*) that sprang up around a garrison on the frontier.⁶³ Yet by no means every son followed his father into the army. The literature of the Empire reveals that, even in the provinces, the man who already possessed Roman citizenship was usually reluctant to become a soldier.⁶⁴ Indeed it almost looks as if citizenship implied exemption from military service,⁶⁵ and it is probably not so very wide of the mark to suggest that this was one of the things that made citizenship so desirable.⁶⁶

Now it is obvious that in the provinces the number of Roman citizens was ever increasing, for not only the legionaries and, on their discharge, the auxiliaries, but also their offspring acquired citizenship; this is a matter of

⁶²For the tribe in which such men were regularly enrolled, see above, note 17; many of them bear the praenomen (or possibly one should say the pseudo-praenomen) SP, on the significance of which see above p. 50. Of the veterans discharged from Legio III Augusta in Africa in the second century, more than half had been born *castris* (C.I.L. 8.3101). Similarly, of thirty-nine soldiers discharged from Legio II Traiana at Alexandria in 194, twenty-two came from *castra* (C.I.L. 3.6580).

⁶³Such settlements came into being very early. The *canabae* at Mainz are earlier than 70 (C.I.L. 13.6797; I.L.S. 9235), and by that year the cantonments at Vetera on the Rhine frontier resembled a veritable *municipium* (Tacitus, *Histories*, 4. 22).

⁶⁴Vell. Pat. 2. 130; Tacitus, *Annals*, 4. 4; Pliny, *Epp.*, 10. 30 (who implies that slaves were often sent as proxies by men who were intent on avoiding service themselves); Suetonius, *Tib.*, 8, *Nero*, 44; Dio 56.23.2; S.H.A., *Hadrian*, 12, 4.

⁶⁵S.H.A., *Marcus Aurelius*, 11, which implies that Italians at least were not expected to serve.

⁶⁶Officers apparently were not difficult to find and they of course were drawn from possessors of the Roman citizenship (normally from families which had had the citizenship for quite some time). Of course far fewer officers than men were needed and their lot was infinitely superior to that of a legionary. An officer's career evidently had some attractions. Command of an auxiliary unit was enticing enough to attract, as direct-entry officers, Roman knights who had already made their mark in civilian life by filling the highest posts in their home towns (it is incorrect to think that all the equestrians who began the *tres militiae* were young men in their late teens or early twenties). The centurionate likewise was generally regarded as a satisfactory outlet for a man's talents; some Roman knights actually preferred to be centurions in a legion than commanders of an auxiliary unit even though this entailed what seems like reversion in rank. As very few centurions could ever hope to attain the exalted rank of a *primus pilus* (even though this was not more or less reserved for ex-praetorians, despite what M. Durry, *Les cohortes prétoiriennes* (Paris, 1938), p. 3, following Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*, seems to imply) and even fewer would reach the lofty appointments to which the primipilate was the gateway, it must be assumed that the centurionate in itself was worth striving for. It should be pointed out, however, that even for officers the army itself was the most reliable source of supply. The overwhelming majority of the centurions were promoted legionaries. In the case of the higher posts, also, those reserved for knights or senators, there was heavy reliance on what we would call service families; for example, many of the young direct-entry equestrian officers were the sons of centurions. Less than one Roman senator in two ever donned uniform and the Roman knights who chose the army as a career were a distinct minority (see E. Birley, "Senators in the Emperor's Service," in *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 39 (1953), p. 202).

the utmost consequence. For if it was the prize of citizenship that attracted men into the army, then clearly the law of diminishing returns was bound, sooner or later, to apply: the more widespread the citizenship, the more restricted the area from which recruits were likely to be obtained.⁶⁷ In particular the towns and cities, a steadily increasing number of which acquired the status of Roman *municipia* or even obtained the charters of *coloniae*, failed to produce their quota of recruits. When the legions could not be kept up to strength from the urban centres their ranks necessarily had to be filled from the country districts.⁶⁸ Authenticated instances of legionaries whose ostensible *municipalis origo* is clearly fictitious and was invented for them merely to qualify them for legionary service can be found as early as the first century in the eastern half of the Empire.⁶⁹ In the second century the practice became universal, so that gradually the distinction between legionary and auxiliary recruits disappeared; both alike were being obtained from the country districts and, increasingly, from the country districts near the frontiers.⁷⁰ This fact may explain why, after 138, the children of an auxiliary were no longer granted the citizenship along with their father on the latter's release from service.⁷¹ Here we probably have an attempt to preserve at least one good source of volunteers.⁷² For, as we have seen, even though soldiers' sons might be more likely prospects for the army than other elements in the population, they too lost their willingness to volunteer the moment that they became citizens. So they were kept in the status of non-citizens for as long as possible: after 138, the auxiliary on discharge acquired the

⁶⁷"As a peaceful civilization developed the recruiting area for legions and *auxilia* alike gradually contracted to the frontier districts." Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, p. 133.

⁶⁸Epigraphic evidence proves that by the second century the inland provinces, the ones where the citizenship had spread furthest, were contributing very few recruits to the armed services. The practice of local recruiting had started long before Hadrian: Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau*, p. 62; but it became increasingly common from his time on: Mommsen, "Die Conscriptionsordnung der römischen Kaiserzeit," p. 29 ff. and Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, p. 76. It was at once the result and the cause of recruits being reluctant to go far from their places of origin. It also at least had the advantage of solving the transportation problem. It is a matter of some interest that, exceptionally, the legions in Britain do not appear to have been recruited locally, not even in the third century: Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano*, p. 88.

⁶⁹See above, note 31.

⁷⁰Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau*, p. 70, points out that the practice of indicating a legionary's place of origin was gradually abandoned: the reason must be that there was no longer any point in indicating it if the majority of legionaries no more had *municipalis origo* than the auxiliaries.

⁷¹The last instance of an auxiliary's discharge *diploma* mentioning citizenship for his children belongs to 138; see H. T. Rowell, "The *Honesta Missio* from the Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army" in *Yale Classical Studies* 6 (1939), 86.

⁷²The reason for the change in policy, which so puzzled Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, p. 32, is explained differently by Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau*, p. 118.

citizenship for himself alone; if his son wanted it, then like his father before him he had to serve in the army to get it.⁷³

The effect of the continuous contraction of the recruiting areas must have been most marked on the *auxilia*. For if the citizenship was the big inducement, then obviously men would prefer to join the service which gave it to them immediately on enlistment. In other words, the legions were bound to get the pick of the provincial recruits, leaving only the dregs for the *auxilia*. In fact, special inducements had to be offered. It is to be noted that, from the beginning of the second century,⁷⁴ an increasing number of auxiliaries were Roman citizens even before their discharge⁷⁵ (a recent calculation estimates that well before the end of the century almost half of them were in this category);⁷⁶ evidently, for the *auxilia* no less than for the legions, the citizenship was being used as a bribe: it may have been given on enlistment or, more probably, special facilities may have been devised for auxiliaries to acquire it.⁷⁷ But despite this the human material in the *auxilia* was anything but the best. Good evidence of this is the emergence c. 100, and the increasing importance thereafter, of a new type of *auxilia*, the national *numeri*.⁷⁸ As compared with other auxiliaries, these were looser in organization and more barbarous in character (the titles of the units suggest that they were drawn from the most uncivilized districts of the Empire), and as the second century wore on ever greater use was made of these barbarian irregulars. By the late second century better-class provincials without the citizenship must have been very few; and consequently the difficulty of obtaining really desirable recruits is hardly surprising. Instead of being men of good family the recruits were now only too likely to be drawn from the lowest and most primitive elements.⁷⁹ Throughout the first and a large part of the second century the recruits' motive had been, if not exactly patriotic, at least not discreditable (for there was nothing inherently unworthy in the desire to acquire Roman citizenship), but it now became worse than dubious. Recruits were only too apt to be men of the rough and reckless type, who were joining the army chiefly in order to get weapons in their hands with which they would be able to extort for themselves an ever greater share of the Empire's collective wealth. Possibly at first they had no clear conception that they were in fact

⁷³Significantly, henceforth it was almost invariably the practice for all auxiliaries to be recruited locally.

⁷⁴The phenomenon was very rare before the Flavians.

⁷⁵See Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, p. 33.

⁷⁶Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau*, p. 77.

⁷⁷At any rate, even when a whole auxiliary unit had the citizenship (as a reward for bravery in action, for example), new recruits were not automatically enfranchised.

⁷⁸On this, see Rowell, "The *Honesta Missio* from the *Numeri* of the Roman Imperial Army," *passim*.

⁷⁹The deterioration in the quality of provincial legionary recruits in the second century can be demonstrated: Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano*, p. 125.

preying upon organized society, and no doubt it took some time before the size and frequency of their demands spelled complete economic ruin for the Empire. Yet already under the first emperor of the third century, Septimius Severus, who, as a provincial born without a drop of Italian blood in his veins, symbolizes in his own person the spread of the citizenship, the soldiers had to be humoured. His army, according to an eye-witness,⁸⁰ was a motley throng very savage to see, very fearsome to hear, and very uncouth to approach. Severus, significantly, thought it necessary to advise his son and successor to enrich the soldiers and disregard everybody else.⁸¹

If things had reached this pass by c. 200, what was likely to be the state of affairs after 212, when Caracalla's *Constitutio Antoniniana* enfranchised all the freeborn inhabitants of the Empire regardless of their race, origin, creed, or mother-tongue? Whatever Caracalla's principal motive may have been, one effect must have been to eliminate what had been a prime inducement for men to enlist. Henceforth it would become increasingly necessary to go outside the Empire altogether in search of soldiers. The thesis of this paper is the tragic paradox that what can surely be regarded as one of the more enlightened features of the Roman Empire, the liberality with which it bestowed its citizenship, contributed in no small measure to its downfall by completing the ruin of the Roman imperial army.

After 212 the army was only too often at odds with the civilians. Cassius Dio, who became consul at Rome within a few years of Caracalla's enfranchising act, took it for granted that an army of long-term volunteers would consist of that "most vigorous but violent element in the population which is usually obliged to make its living by banditry."⁸² The Roman imperial army, like any other, had always included a certain proportion of adventurous roughnecks, and even of criminals, in its ranks. But so long as the prospect of acquiring Roman citizenship had spurred men of a different stamp to enlist, it had not got out of hand. In the third century, however, it became quite uncontrollable. It kindled an unending series of civil wars, it spawned a well-nigh inexhaustible list of pretenders, it made and unmade emperors with the most reckless abandon, and it battered greedily on everything that it could extort from the civilian population. This parlous state of affairs, significantly, supervened after 212 when there were to all intents and purposes no non-citizens left in the Empire. It is with Maximin (235-8) that the anarchy of the so-called Barrack Emperors really begins.

It would not have been easy in any case to maintain the army at full strength because of the way that the population of the Empire, or at least of its western half, was beginning to decline.⁸³ In the west a serious shortage of

⁸⁰Cassius Dio 74. 2.

⁸¹Cassius Dio 77. 15. 2.

⁸²Cassius Dio 52. 27.

⁸³This has been recently stressed by A. E. R. Boak, *Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West* (Ann Arbor, 1955).

manpower, caused possibly by epidemics, possibly by excessive urbanization (cities being notoriously bad breeders), possibly by other factors, was starting to manifest itself. This, of course, aggravated the problem of finding recruits. Changed conditions of warfare also no doubt complicated recruiting. As cavalry came to play an ever more important role, the wild cowboys of the frontier areas would be in demand. But probably it was not so much the decline in population or the need for skilled riders as the universal grant of citizenship that was responsible for the deterioration in army personnel. Men of the better type no longer had any inducement to volunteer.

With the citizenship no longer available as a bribe, various devices were used to attract recruits: increased pay, free rations, larger and more frequent donatives, the right to legal wedlock. Severus Alexander is said to have offered grants of land as the bait to soldiers' sons.⁸⁴ But it was all to no avail: none of these makeshifts improved the calibre of the troops. When, towards the end of the third century, barbarian assaults had helped to rekindle the fires of patriotism, it might be another story; for the time being, that is, for the middle years of the third century, the Roman army did not get enough recruits and those that it did get were *faute de mieux* obtained for the most part from the roughest and lowest elements of the population, if not from the martial peoples outside the Empire,⁸⁵ men who knew little and cared less about Rome's mission and who, when not preying upon the civilians, had not the slightest compunction about preying upon one another.

It was the chaos caused by these unruly soldiers which provided the barbarians beyond the frontiers with their opportunity, and they seized it with avidity. And the assaults of these barbarian hordes led directly to the most obvious, if not indeed the most important, of all the causes for the decline and fall: military collapse.

Surely, however, the historian's duty is to explain, if he can, why the barbarians attacked in the first place and why they were so successful when they did. It may not be fanciful to seek the explanation in the reduced numbers, and above all in the inferior character, of the men in the ranks of the Roman imperial army in the third century, an army which, owing to Caracalla's enfranchising act, was probably undermanned and recruited largely from the irresponsible elements of the population. An Empire whose defenders were thus few in quantity and poor in quality must have been tempting bait to the outer barbarians. Small wonder is it that they fell upon the Empire and thereby set in train that fateful sequence of events which resulted finally in its disintegration.


⁸⁴S.H.A., *Alex. Sev.* 58. The growth of settlements along Hadrian's Wall in Britain may perhaps be the result of these land grants: Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, p. 86.

⁸⁵The way in which Hercules became the object of general worship in the army from the second century on suggests an increasing proportion of German recruits who had a particular regard for Hercules (they equated him with their native god, Donnar): Domaszewski, *Die Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*, pp. 7, 46.



Symposium: "An Attack on the Crisis:
The Scholar Talks Back"





Sputnik—Now

W. T. EASTERBROOK, F.R.S.C.

WE are considering in this symposium the impact of Sputnik, a nebulous if timely topic, and discretion leads me to preface my remarks with two observations. First, since it takes an age to interpret an age, there is little point at the very beginning of the Sputnik era in dwelling on the ultimate impact of the space satellite. This is a parlour game we would do well to leave to others. I shall concentrate rather on what Sputnik means to us now. Secondly, even with this limitation, to attempt to speak for social scientists in general is to face formidable difficulties. Each of the disciplines has its bias and it is clearly presumptuous to pose as spokesman for the lot. I do not pretend that my own area of interest, general economic history, approaches a synthetic view of events more closely than other divisions of the social sciences, yet I take comfort in the fact that the economic historian, brought by the nature of his subject into close and frequent contact with other social scientists, has a useful vantage point in what is essentially a field of interdisciplinary study. For all that, I'm inclined to agree with a view expressed recently that the subject of this session is one which might well be left with the philosopher.

It is my impression, at least at the moment, that for the social scientist at any rate, Sputnik's message is less remarkable for its novelty than for the urgency it gives to questions which have been troubling him for some time. It draws attention, of course, to the material progress achieved by the U.S.S.R., but it is scarcely news that induced growth, that in which the controlling decisions are in the hands of the very few and the very big, is likely to be rapid, even spectacular, growth. We know that only the giant administrative unit, state or private, can perfect and apply the technologies of our time, and that nowadays concentrations of economic and political power shape the pattern of events. The prospect of eventual collision sets the stage for conflict, but if there is anything new about the present crisis, I fail to see it. It is true that we worry more, and sometimes about strange things. There is, for example, the odd case of the megacorpse, the million bodies strewn about following a nuclear explosion; it seems that it is likely to be a disposal problem here and that some are concerned about it. But clearly this is no task for the social scientist.

I am not implying by this that he can turn his back on Sputnik. Although he shares none of the limelight enjoyed by the missiles expert or the educationist, the pressures of the time must inevitably leave their mark. I would distinguish, however, between the method of the social scientist and his role

in present-day affairs. As to method, new impetus may have been given to the search for more flexible and comprehensive frameworks or systems of analysis, but I doubt whether we should expect any radical changes in this area; the need for enlarging the spatial and temporal dimensions of the social scientist's enquiries has been known for some time. In the task of discovering uniformities underlying diversities, it is still his problem to establish the initial conditions of the process under study, to ascertain the course of change which would normally follow from these conditions, and to take account of the deviations which occur when shocks are sufficiently great to rule out their treatment as random elements. Sputnik may bring about some acceleration in the rate of progress in the analytical realm, but scarcely a new departure from established ways.

There is one respect in which these remarks on method might be qualified somewhat: in a world of technological breakthroughs, any pretensions to the scientific prediction of events must give way to much more modest aims. Whether or not man in his true humanity can predict or be predicted, there is clearly a need to distinguish between the assessment of the probable results of specified occurrences or conditions and the more ambitious forecast of future unknown events. This distinction is unfortunately overlooked in much present-day discussion, in which an ever-increasing amount of forecasting is being done amidst a growing scepticism about the accuracy of the results. This scarcely indicates a healthy state of mind, and I would remind you of Cato's expression of surprise that soothsayers did not laugh when meeting other soothsayers. Their art is one that should have small place in this symposium.

Apart from method, Sputnik has more to say and on two counts. In the first place, this dramatic plunge into outer space has helped to clarify issues which as far as the public is concerned have, until recently, remained in the background. Specialists and experts have been aware for some time of the rate of industrial progress in the so-called unfree sectors of the globe, but now the significance of differential rates of growth and of massive technological changes is known to the many. This general and widespread recognition of the magnitude of present and prospective shifts in centres of economic and political gravity, and of the sharpness of the technological impact on institutions and ideas cannot fail to leave its impression on the social sciences. Questions once left to departments of state for action, and to Learned Societies for talk, are now matters of acute public concern, and the social scientist, called on not so much to discard the tools of his trade for new ones as to apply them under pressure to a larger area than he has been accustomed to in the past, cannot escape the challenge.

Secondly, since it is now clear to almost everyone that total war means the end of the game for all participants and that limited wars carry with them the obvious danger of war unlimited, there is good reason to assume that world conflict will increasingly take forms other than military. Investment and trade have been potent weapons in past conflicts; they are now at

the heart of global struggles between or among power blocs. I do not mean by this to suggest that economic objectives have become paramount, far from it, but rather that policies which offer the greatest hope of freedom from want (and want is a highly elastic term) are likely to be the most effective in bringing others round to our way of thinking, and incidentally of strengthening our own conviction that we are on the right track.

This is a much more complex and difficult question than it was assumed to be even a decade ago. Events have shown very clearly that a global potlatch, or more generally, an earnest desire to do well by others less fortunate than we, does little more than arouse resentment among those helped the most, in part because such aid brings home to the recipients just how few of this world's possessions are theirs. It is apparent from recent and unhappy experience that not only do we know much too little about the institutions and ways of life, the hopes and aspirations of less economically advanced nations than ours, but we are far from clear about those aspects of our culture which we seek to transplant in other areas. And on both scores, domestic and foreign, internal and external, the social scientist must accept at least some of the blame. Concentration on the short run, and preoccupation with national problems have given rise to a bias which makes communication with others exceedingly difficult, a theme on which Innis had much to say in his later work.

There is, for example, the all-too-commonly held assumption that there is something natural or right about the way in which our institutions have changed or evolved, that some such pattern is the right pattern for others less advanced than we are. Note how easy it is for the highly industrialized nations to overlook the crucially important place of agriculture in the underdeveloped countries; we expose rural societies to advanced technologies and are surprised at the tensions which result. This suggests the need for better utilization of present knowledge in the social sciences along with more direct reference to objectives which cannot be achieved so long as the social scientist sits on the side-lines.

* * *

Let me turn, by way of illustration, to one of the issues on which energies might be focused. There are others of course, but none to which Sputnik has drawn more attention. I have in mind the investment strategies of our time. These strategies take us well beyond the concerns of the economist, for investment has become a key weapon in conflicts in which the primary objective is less one of market returns or political control than of the active transformation of other cultures. And the instruments in this conflict are the dollar and the ruble. Unlike movements of commodities, flows of capital are invisible items but, for all that, they exert a force for change in established institutions and ways of life unmatched by any other agency apart from force itself. As any Canadian knows, they serve to strengthen enormously the pulling power of the lender, they give rise to tensions which increase with

exposure to external influences, and as some Latin Americans know, the shock is greatest where cultural differences are great.

Investment, unfortunately, has been viewed primarily as a matter of business accounting; the broader social and political impact, if not entirely ignored, has been neglected as a consequence of faith in the power of capital plus goodwill to bring, more or less automatically, desirable changes in the institutions and attitudes of backward areas. Before Sputnik, there was some concern about the failure of borrowers to react as expected; Sputnik has made it clear that the investment game is so decisive an aspect of world rivalries that we cannot afford to play it badly. Canada, even though spared the pains of world leadership, can no more afford to regard this as an academic issue than can her neighbour. Investments form a network in which all of us are caught and no External Affairs Minister can keep us free of it.

In all the talk about trade and trade policies, wheat, lead, zinc, and Ford cars, it is sometimes overlooked that the most critical aspect of the return impact of the United States on other parts of the world has come to be the volume and direction of movements of capital from that country. As to volume, quite apart from governmental grants and credits which have averaged roughly five billion dollars per annum since 1946, or three and one-half billion dollars if military grants are excluded, private long-term investment has shown a striking increase in recent years. This outflow of private capital approaches four billion dollars annually, a figure which considerably understates the volume of capital expenditures by the United States in foreign countries since it does not include exploration and development expenditures charged off, or outlays for plant and equipment equal to depreciation and development allowances. It is significant that a large part of this sum is in the form of direct investments by United States companies. At the close of 1956, of a total private long-term investment in excess of thirty billion dollars, twenty-two billion was in the form of direct investment, a figure which again substantially understates the total since the book values in which it is expressed are considerably lower than market or replacement values.

This movement of capital has proceeded in the face of obstacles raised by inconvertible currencies and threats of expropriation, discriminatory taxation, and demands for greater local control. There are good reasons now for expecting that the rate of flow will increase very substantially over the next decade or so. I leave to crystal-gazers the pleasure of forecasting future growth, but estimates of private long-term investment suggest the probability of a total in excess of one hundred billion dollars by 1975. Experts point to the likelihood of a snowballing and of an upward cumulative movement of private capital exports from the United States, and more than one authoritative study has referred to the coming investment explosion. This is seen as the consequence of a number of factors, including the propensity to plough back profits, the role of foreign investment as a major source of financing trade exports of the United States, that country's growing need for raw materials,

and the advantages that come with increasing experience and knowledge of foreign investment fields. There is, in addition, the prospect of tax revisions designed to encourage a greater volume of foreign investment, and a growing awareness of the political returns of long-term loans at low rates of interest.

In view of the magnitude of this capital movement and the penetrative powers of capital, it seems obvious that serious errors can be fatal errors, particularly in a world in which there is little time for a second chance. Recent experience in Latin America suggests that investment strategies must take us well beyond the calculus of the market place. Three hundred United States firms operating there can point to the good they have done: the production of five billion dollars of goods and services annually for local and export markets, the billion dollars paid each year to more than 600,000 employees, the annual tax bill which exceeds one billion dollars and brings in about 15 per cent of all governmental revenues; the list could be expanded to include reference to the annual expenditure of two billion dollars on locally produced materials, supplies, and equipment, and the encouragement of initiative and technical aptitudes in the population. Venezuela is now close to the top in terms of Latin American income per capita, a direct consequence of the economic benefits of the United States investment bonanza. Yet Mr. Nixon, unwittingly perhaps, has made it clear that we have much to learn about the politics, the sociology, and the social psychology of investment programmes.

Our shortcomings are reflected in domestic as well as foreign investment policies and I am inclined to stress the domestic side of the picture, for if we are to encourage and support growth in other areas along lines which strengthen ties of friendship or at the least do not create new enmities, there is much to be said for greater knowledge and understanding of the process of growth at home. On this score the past and present patterns of investment take us close to the heart of the matter. We have a good deal of statistical material to draw upon and a reasonably accurate picture of the course of events in North America, but we are decidedly vague about the determinants of change and the "whys" of the investment process. Why, for example, do the patterns of development in Canada and the United States, neighbouring nations of the same continental complex, display such striking contrasts in the kind as well as the rate of growth? This is not a question for the specialist or the expert of the short run and no one-factor explanations will do. Whether reference be to the beginnings or the later phases of development or to the uncertainties of the present, it is clear that investment strategies have been determined and investment channelled by a complex interaction of social and political institutions with economic and resource factors, an interaction which set the stage for the decision-makers in the investment of time, energy, and capital in various pursuits. This very complexity may account for the tendency to overlook differences in experience with investment, differences great enough to raise problems of understanding between Canada and the United States. It is not surprising that such problems take on greater

dimensions where, as in the Middle East, any similarities with our past are hard to find. We tend to bury differences in the big-word "isms" which have done so much harm in the social sciences.


In short, there is something to be said for looking inward and backward on the grounds that self-knowledge is essential to greater realism in the area of external relations. Progress in the study of the investment setting of the backward areas is encouraging and it was well under way before Sputnik, but present difficulties underline the need of coming to grips with basic differences in the conditions of investment in areas of supply and demand for capital funds. As the United States seems to be discovering, large-scale investment brings its pressures for change in creditor as well as debtor countries, even though her trade policies indicate that she is learning much too slowly. The failure to view investment in a larger time-space context than that of the nineteenth century, the tendency to overlook profound differences in different settings of investment, and the assumption that investment is mainly the concern of business men and economists, these make for poor strategy in a critically important area of international rivalries. Here, it seems to me, there is both a challenge and an opportunity for the social scientist; if Sputnik fails to smoke him out, nothing will.

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I have dwelt on this theme of investment strategy at some length as a means of drawing attention to some neglected elements in the international game of follow the leader. We hear a good deal about the rate and magnitude of technological change and its meaning for the centres of power in this early Sputnik era. We would do well, I think, to make more of the timing of this change. The U.S.S.R., in the first flush of its massive take-off into the new industrialism, blessed with a clear and simple ideology, has the benefit of a novelty that the United States, a nation which took off, so to speak, roughly a century ago, lacks. It is easy to forget that in the investment experience of the United States a similar phase was made possible by concentration of political and economic power, and that the tendency to regard freedom of investment as a necessary condition of progress, even survival, is the outcome of circumstances not likely to be repeated in our time. We are afflicted with a certain loss of memory reflected in a vagueness about our economic beginnings which may explain the retention of attitudes rooted in a short-lived phase of growth. Freedom of investment came only when the groundwork had been laid by the power tactics of an earlier period. Sputnik may help to bring us up to date in our thinking.

In placing such emphasis on this aspect of present-day rivalries, I am aware that I am displaying the bias of my craft, but I put it forward as the kind of issue on which the energies and talents of social scientists might be focused, even a feeling of community aroused. We know that periods of great uncertainty are periods of great coalitions; there is something to be said for social scientists' coalescing too. It is characteristic of coalitions that they

exert a direct shaping influence on the environments in which they operate, and a passive response is a luxury which social scientists cannot indulge in now. We can thank Sputnik for helping to clarify such issues as this, for bringing home to the lot of us the urgency of the problems resulting from present shifts in power. We may hope for a resulting shift in the social scientist's point of view, but this remains a hope—not a forecast.



“And God said, Let there be light”

F. M. SALTER, F.R.S.C.

SOME years ago, teaching summer school at a university where parking space was scarce, I found the campus policeman friendly and accommodating. One day he guided me to a parking place labelled with the name of the President. “It’s all right,” he said, “the President’s away.” Glancing at the rear-view mirror as I gathered my things together, I saw the President drive up behind me. I assessed the situation quickly and, I believe, rightly: if I did not hurry, I should be late for class. The President was only a flunkey, but I was a classroom teacher. It was his privilege to look after the machinery and make sure that I could carry on efficiently and happily in my working place. Any little inconvenience I might cause him was as nothing compared with the heinousness of my being late for class. I therefore slipped blithely out and got under way. As I did so, I heard an august and world-famous dignitary behind me exclaim to the policeman, “Who the hell does he think he is?”

The question has bothered me ever since. Who am I, and who do I think I am? I can find no satisfactory answer. In that simple query you see the gift of a great university president, the man who stimulates thinking, research, and creativity in other men. I say creativity advisedly for some day, surely, I shall have created a god in my own image—other men have done so—and be able to stand back and say, “That’s who I think I am.” But today I can only follow the inspiring example, and ask *you*: Who do you think you are?

You are humanists, of course. That is to say, you have turned your backs on God. In the Middle Ages man’s gaze was fixed on God and eternity, and this life was a mere breath, a time of trial and tribulation, “a cherry-fair full of woe.” But Renaissance man turned his attention away from eternity to contemplate human and humane values in this life. He became a humanist. Salvation to him was not a matter of grace or of castigation of the flesh and endless penance for sin, but of profound study of Latin and Greek, history and philosophy, the fine arts, and all that concerns a cultivated, urbane, and satisfying life in this world. Humanists, then, are a godless breed, concerned only with the Here, and not with the Hereafter.

One of Shakespeare’s heroes credits the Devil with an ability to quote Scripture for his purposes. Humanists have the same skill. They are fond of saying, “Man cannot live by bread alone.” But Deuteronomy says (8 : 3), “Man *doth not* live by bread only; but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God doth man live.” St. Matthew says (4 : 3) that when

Satan tempted our Lord to make bread from stones, He answered, "It is written Man *shall not* live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." St. Luke (4 : 4) agrees almost word for word. The godless humanist could hardly be expected to retain the second part of these quotations, that man lives by the word of God, but when he alters *doth not* and *shall not* to *cannot*, does he not equal Satan in guile?

You are humanists, then, and you believe that man cannot live by bread alone. That is to say, the humanist is a man who blinds himself to facts. Every day in bus or street or market he rubs shoulders with people who live by bread alone—and if they do, they can.

Further, the typical humanist is so wrapped up in humanistic studies and enjoyment that he has no interest in the larger world around him—and his gaze is too myopic to let him see the millions of men, women, and children on this earth who are at this moment starving for want of bread. Or does he say to them, in effect, "Study your classics, attend the opera, remember the consolations of philosophy, collect paintings and pieces of sculpture, and you will forget that you have nothing to fill your belly." I would ask such a humanist a very simple question, "Have you ever been hungry?" And this question also I pass on to this audience. It is very pleasant when other men are working, toiling, slaving, the dust of the fields in their lungs, the stench of the slaughter-house in their nostrils, it is very pleasant to sit here and debate high things, but have you ever been hungry? If you have, I doubt if Shakespeare or Mozart appealed to you nearly as much at that time as the contents of a garbage can.

Or let us step back a few generations to our pioneers, the men who made life possible for us. It is a very strange thing, but the fact is that the men who toiled sixteen hours a day hacking out clearings in the bush never thought to bring a symphony orchestra along with them. They didn't even have theatres where the ballet or the living drama could feed their souls. Not one of them thought to bring along the Bodleian Library or the British Museum or the National Portrait Gallery. And yet they lived, and did good work, and their name is blessed forevermore. The humanist will of course quibble; he will say they did not live, but existed. I say they lived, and many of them in the richest, fullest sense of that term. For the true ingredients of life, as distinguished from existence, are "Faith, hope, and charity, these three, but the greatest of these is charity." And I say that a man with no knowledge of the classics, no knowledge of philosophy, no knowledge of history or literature or the fine arts can live a full, rounded, profitable life, blessed in the sight of God and man.

Let us no longer act like kings of infinite space in our nutshells, but look outward into the realities of human life on this earth.

It is inevitable that man's first preoccupations should be with food, shelter, safety, and security. These preoccupations are reflected in our national budget which gives about three hundred million dollars a year to science and about four million dollars to the Canada Council. These preoccupations are

reflected also in the lives of our pioneers. It is only after wealth has accumulated and society can afford a leisure class that any attention at all is given to the humanities. But the humanist believes himself, God knows why, to be the flower of the human race, and that he should toil not, neither should he spin. In plain terms, he is a parasite upon the body of society.

Out there in the hinterland is a man operating a bulldozer or one of those huge earth-moving machines that rattle and jerk his kidneys apart. On the sweat of that man's brow the humanist lives. Deep underground is a man with his shoulder to a pneumatic drill that shatters his guts. To him the humanist owes his longevity. In the cattle-yards, slaughter-pens, butchering and packing rooms are hundreds of men and women whose lives to us seem bare and brutal. To them the humanist owes his daily bread. And so through the whole complex of modern society, where untold millions live by bread alone, or by bread and something more exclusive of the humanities, men and women are creating the wealth which permits the humanist to live.

And now that I have shown the typical humanist to be godless, guileful, myopic, self-centred, and indifferent to the society on which he is a parasite, I return to that disturbing question, "Who the hell do you think you are?" And all I can think of in reply is, "Who and what I am, I do not know; but I would like to be a humanist."

So saying, I am obliged to think of the humanist in terms very different from those already used. Let me, then, sketch out the creed of such a person as a humanist might be, should be, and sometimes is: (1) I believe that the humanist should strive to be a man, and that a man should speak his mind. (2) I believe that the humanist's first duty is to return to society one hundredfold the value that society has invested in him. (3) I believe that the world has grown, and will grow, more humane; in other words, I believe in the perfectibility of man. (4) I believe that humanism should leaven the lump, and that it is the most precious ingredient of human welfare on this earth.

First of all, the humanist should be a man. He dare not so call himself unless he feels his brotherhood with all human beings, of whatever creed or condition or country or colour or class. This credo removes a large part of that indictment of the humanist hitherto presented. The humanist who is a man cannot be godless, for men of diverse breed and condition can only be brothers under the fatherhood of God. Nor can any man who is a man be guileful, myopic, selfish, or indifferent to that society to which he owes his being. These qualities are bestial. Webster defines humanism as "A mode or attitude of thought or action centering upon distinctively human interests or ideals." Originally these ideals were found primarily in the art and literature of ancient Greece and Rome. These were, therefore, the first subjects of humanistic study. They cannot now be called the only humanistic studies, or even the most important. The word *human*, of course, as used by Webster in "distinctively human interests and ideals" distinguishes these interests and ideals from those of other animals. Common to all animals are the basic

needs of food, warmth, and shelter, the bread of life. Man is other than brute in that he needs, for full development, more than bread—and as I have tried to suggest, religion and humanism are not mutually exclusive. Man is other than brute also in that he has a sense of beauty. He can feel wonder and reverence and pity and sympathy. He can look before and after into the farthest reaches of time, he can create, and he can love his neighbour, even though that neighbour be a man he has never seen who lives on the other side of the earth. If, then, we wish the world to be civilized, humane, or fit for human beings to live in, we must cultivate especially those things in man which distinguish him from the beast. And here, as so often, charity begins at home: the humanist himself should be a man.

If the humanist is a man, then he should speak his mind. If he has no mind to speak, he is neither man nor humanist. Are there inhumanities in the world? The humanist should have his say about them. And he should say his say in the right time and place.

I take it that most of us here are academics. Are there unfairnesses, injustices, wrongs, evils within our universities? Of course there are. What does the humanist say about them? In my observation, he grumbles in holes and corners, but when time and place adhere, he is silent. Or if some lone voice is raised in protest, do the humanists rally round? No, like the wedding guests, with one accord they make excuse within themselves and remain silent—until afterwards. Afterwards they are vocal enough in support—in holes and corners, by telephone, and even by letter.

Or let me ask you: when the "witch-hunt" was on in the United States, a land where humanists are as thick on the ground as dandelions in a neglected field, and when the reputations and even the livelihood of academic personnel became playthings of foul, political ambition, did the humanists rise in their united strength to say to the unspeakable McCarthy, "Thou shalt not!"? The protests were few and far between. Or when the indescribable horrors of Hitler were let loose on humanistic Germany, the foster-nurse of world scholarship in the humanities, the fertile soil of music and other arts, did the humanists object? Yes, one or two, unsupported. But beyond the borders of Germany, where they were safe, the humanists put up a most valiant chorus.

And today, typically enough, in this room, we are asked to "talk back to Sputnik." But what I want to know is, who is talking back to Sputnik *in Russia*, and who in Canada is talking back to the DEW line? In a day when universal education is needed with a feverish desperation never known before, we spend enough money on that fantastic creation, that imbeciles' delight, to duplicate this University in a thousand towns, or provide room, board, and tuition for every college student in Canada for the next hundred years. But who in Canada is willing to say a word against provocative insanity, and a word in favour of loving one's neighbour as himself? Who in Canada protests that we are tying our economy to brinkmanship, to chip

on the shoulder; who protests that Canada herself is a sputnik swinging in an orbit about that country which booms on wars and rumours of war, and otherwise busts? Or if today we had been asked to discuss "Humanism and Atomic Fallout," could you have got a panel together? Our silence shouts that the imminent extinction of the human race, and of all humane values and humanistic studies with it, is of no concern to the humanist, that we are content to live with Hiroshima and Nagasaki as prime examples of man's humanity to man.

Now I think—if I may for a moment indulge that fiction and speak of the humanist as the flower of the human race, or as the apex of the pyramid of man—I think that the humanistic influence should filter all the way down. If the humanities are taught at the University of Alberta, for example, and if all our school-teachers attend the University, I shall not be happy until every child in grade I comes under the civilizing and kindly influence that should emanate from this centre. In civilized countries hardened criminals are no longer flogged, but in Alberta schools the strap is still used on little children. I shall never be happy until every teacher and every citizen of our land has been truly humanized.

Meantime some things disturb me. One is the indifference of our students to international affairs—or even to national or provincial ones. In the Old World students are always in the forefront of battles for democracy and reform. Only a few months ago the inept Lord Hailsham feebly complained about what he called "Government by student referendum." It is most improbable that Canadian students would ever be interested enough to create a referendum on a matter of national importance. Why? Our universities are full of humanists—or people who call themselves humanists. But example is the greatest of all teachers, and silent prophets will beget silent disciples. In Britain, J. B. Priestley, Bertrand Russell, J. B. S. Haldane, and others have not been at all backward in speaking their minds—and the young follow these brilliant examples.

By contrast, a few years ago some professors on this campus chipped in a dime each to send a telegram of encouragement to Mr. Adlai Stevenson who was then campaigning for the presidency of the United States. Local newspapers got wind of this dire conspiracy, and one would have thought from their reports and editorials that these professors were guilty of fomenting war at least. They were interfering in the affairs of another nation and endangering the friendship between Canada and the United States. They were Reds, they were Fascists, they were Anarchists—in short, they were egg-heads. In the Old Country no such group of professors would have taken that smear lying down. Supine leaders can hardly inspire either the idealism of youth or the support of the public. As for public support, not a voice in all Alberta inquired of the press, "How silly can you get?"

You will have noticed a sense of bewilderment behind this paper. My assignment read, "An attack upon the present state of crisis brought vividly

to our attention by inter-continental missiles, sputniks, etc." Have I been caught napping? What *is* this crisis? And how can I address myself to a crisis of which I am unaware?

Let me put it this way. I have laboured long in the vineyard and been happy in my labour, no man happier. But when I have raised my eyes to look at the institutions in which I have taught, the towns in which I have lived, the country whose citizenship I held, or the larger world, I have never found reason for complacency, but often for discontent and even anger. What is there today, all of a sudden, that can be called a crisis? Is it that modern science is a prostitute, a kept mistress of the god of war? We should have protested ten years ago and more that science enslaved is not science at all. Are the reports that Russia has a fine educational system a crisis? But we should be pleased, for education is the friend of man, and not the enemy. Is it the satellites that we should be disturbed about? They are an accomplished fact. We may indeed learn from them some of the secrets of outer space; but when millions on this earth are destitute and ignorant, we may question whether these secrets are worth the colossal cost, even if the avowed purpose of the satellites were the real one. As for that, the spectacle of bloody Mars posing as a scientist must be one of the grimmest jokes in all history. And we may indeed duplicate on other planets the life that has bloomed so strangely on our own, but only idiocy would want this life, as it largely is, duplicated. But is June, 1958, the time to make such comments? When were the vast moneys behind these experiments first appropriated? Must the humanist forever drag along ten years behind a parade which marches with bands and banners in a country not his own?

I do detect something that seems new in the general situation, and that is that a great many non-humanists and recent enemies of the humanities are now clamouring for more emphasis upon humanistic studies. Why? What are they afraid of? What are they trying to cover up? What are they running away from? A leopard does not change his spots, and a cur is a cur. Let this yapping get into full cry, or change the emphasis ever so little, and you will find the humanities and humanists hunted like foxes into the earth—and the real reason will be that with their doses of poetry and drama and fine arts and philosophy they have failed to make people forget the bestialities of this world and the fact that it hovers on the brink of brutal self-extinction. We shall be obliged to teach, not the humanities, but propaganda in the name of the humanities.

In a fog, then, as to the precise nature of the crisis to which I should address myself, I can only speak to crises generally and say that a humanist should be a man, and that a man should speak his mind. And let us not fool ourselves and say, "Some men have natural courage: let *them* attack! Besides, I am a recluse." What is the good of humanistic studies if men, ripe in learning, can still live meanly and contemptibly? We have been told, often enough, that faith without works is dead—or, in the language of educationists, that our studious enterprises should have desirable social

outcomes. As for courage, those of my generation learned the truth of this matter in World War I when it was a byword that the man who said he was not afraid was a liar. We are all cowards, every one. We are all physical, intellectual, and moral cowards; but we have to act like men, nevertheless. And for reward, there is this: no man ever lost anything, anything worth keeping, by saying his honest say. Further, no man can remain a man or live with himself, without self-respect. And to be able to live with oneself in the long reaches of a sleepless night, without self-excuse or self-pity, is a blessing richer than oil wells.

One credo of the humanist I have not touched upon at all. It is: "I believe that the world has grown and will grow more humane; I believe in the perfectibility of man." If you wish a full statement of this matter, you will just have to ask me back for another paper at another time. For the moment I can only say that this is a matter in whose truth, the horrors I have mentioned to the contrary notwithstanding, I firmly believe. Without such a faith, I cannot see how any humanist can live fruitfully. The cynic, after all, is one whose "words to wind are scattered, and his mouth is stopped with dust."

Nor can I fully develop the last credo that humanism is the most precious ingredient of human welfare on this earth; but few in this audience, surely, would disagree. Humanism, whatever the dictionary may say, is the light all of us have seen, alas too rarely, transfiguring the faces of students in our classes. That light is worth more to the world than all the opened secrets of atomic fission—and it is accompanied by no such wicked angel as the atomic bomb. That light, call it mere intelligence, call it the sense of delight, wonder, sympathy, reverence, or the awakening perception of beauty, that illumination has humanized the faces of man all the way back to the monk in the cloister teaching little children the Christ-cross row in their horn-books; and that radiance is one which, please God, the Author of all light, will never be put out on this earth.

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